my friends dad was one off the soldiers that was captured along with lt gen percival at singapore , but are you aware but for a twist off fate almost twenty years earlier that the british army in the east may well have successfully defended singapore under a different commander , but for the fact that gen percival survived an assination attempt on his life in brandon west cork twenty years earlier .
major percival as he was rhen known was the officer in charge of the notorious 1st essex reg which served in west cork ," day and night he raided homes and arrested numbers including civilians , he was described as being the most anti irish of all serving british officers " as quoted by book
however the west cork flying column decided to repay his kindness and sentenced him to immediate death , he was well watched and a routine was established off his movements , tom barry officer wt cork brigade was despatched with another volunteer to murder percival .
however fate intervened and percival had been despatched to another engagement an hour earlier that day .
tom barry never did get the chance to try again but in his memoriors he mentions this and the subsequent british surrender in the east under gen percival as follows "disappointed , we trudged , little thinking that major percival , who was to fail so dismally against west cork ira was later to become the commander of the pathetic surrender of1941 at singapore , we could not foresee that our target that night would as LT GEN PERCIVAL CIC of ninty thousand british troops , surrender to a much smaller force off japanese "
had things turned out different that night i ask would the japanese tide have been stopped underdifferent circumstances and a different leader , would make an interesting theory .
NB my mate s dad was captured in singapore and endured terrible inprisonment and starvation , he like others wanted to fight on but could not , their sufferings were forgotten this should not be so
Lt general percival surrender at singapore
Moderator: Tanaka
Thanks for posting this mate. In my opinion under a different General the British could probaly of held off the Japanese in Malaya and Singapore, which would of ment a much shorter war, no Thai Burma railway horror and a continued British presence in the Far East.had things turned out different that night i ask would the japanese tide have been stopped underdifferent circumstances and a different leader , would make an interesting theory .
just goes to show how the actions of one man can affect thousands in the future.
found the book
found the book will bring it along with me when we go over , tactics employed by tom barry , michael collins et al were widely studied and adopted by the soviets , cubans and eastern countries as a template for their methodology of warfare ie molotov cocktail used in ireland in the early twenties ,
i believe that the british eastern army under a different general would no doubt have defended singapore and indeed stopped the tide off japanese victories but history alas decided otherwise
i believe that the british eastern army under a different general would no doubt have defended singapore and indeed stopped the tide off japanese victories but history alas decided otherwise
cheers mate, i owe you a drink or two when i see you 
Thought i would write up abit on the Singapore battle so that people could see what happend and whether Percival was responsible.
Part 1
Black rain fell on Singapore on Sunday, February 15, 1942. It fell through clouds of black smoke billowing from the blazing oil storage tanks that the British had ordered to be burnt so that they would not fall into the hands of the invading Japanese. The British would not be needing the oil anymore, for they were surrendering.
The capitulation of the ‘impregnable’ natural fortress island of Singapore as the end of a long invasion road for the Japanese. But it was the end of an even longer road for the British. For when allied troops – outwitted, outfought and outmanoeuvred – handed over Singapore to the Japanese, they were also handing over imperial control in Asia. Above all, they were presaging the end of the British Empire – the destruction of the myth that Britain could protect her far – flung colonies from all corners.
And it need not have been so. When the Japanese invasion force landed and began their long sweep down the Malay Peninsula, they were heavily outnumbered by the British, Australian and Indian Forces who stood in their path. The Japanese, commanded by General Tomoyuki Yamashita, started out with no airfields, no naval cover and an inferior armoury. They made up for it with determination, imagination and brutality.
The Japanese overcame resistance by going around it. Whenever the allies drew up new defensive lines, the Japanese took to the sea in stolen boats and landed further down the coast. The Royal Navy was nowhere to be seen. The promised ships for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, Britain’s primary naval base in the Far East, never arrived. Nor did promised air reinforcements. There was nothing to stop the Japanese.
For most of their journey south towards Singapore, the enemy were able to pedal on bicycles along tracks through what was thought to be impenetrable jungle, guided by no more than school Atlases. At the beginning of February 1942 they arrived along with their captured planes, guns and trucks, at Johore, at the foot of the Malay Peninsula, and looked across the narrow Johore Straight at the stronghold they were determined to win – Singapore.
Singapore is an island about 20 miles long by 10 miles wide, joined to the mainland by a 1,100-yard causeway. To the south of the island, facing out to sea, is Singapore city, people by Malays and Chinese. To the north, facing the mainland was what was then thought to be one of the most important military strong points in the world – the Royal Navy base.
For a century, Singapore had been the cornerstone of British supremacy in the Far East. It was labelled the ‘Gibraltar of the East’ and the ‘Bastion of the British empire’. But it was neither of these. Because of the strange military blindness that seems to have afflicted so many of Britain’s wartime leaders, Singapore was fortified against attack from the sea but was wide open to a landing across the Johore Straight.
Singapore had slumbered for to long to be in any way prepared for the army that was about to overwhelm it. Not until 2 days before Christmas of 1941 did Lt Gen Percival, leader of the British Malaya command, order a survey of the north coast of the island to plan defensive works. No action was taken on his order for 2 weeks.
Winston Churchill was not fully alerted to the risible state of Singapore’s defences until January 16, when he received a telegram about them from General Wavell, who had recently been appointed Supreme commander of the area. Churchill immediately sent and a long and urgent directive to his chiefs of staff: ‘I must confess to being staggered by Wavells telegram…. Merely to have seaward defences and no forts or fixed defences to protect the rear is not to be excused on any ground. I warn you this will be one of the greatest scandals that could possibly be exposed.
‘let a plan be made at once to do the best possible while the battle on Johore is going forward. This plan should comprise; an attempt to use the fortress guns on the northern front by firing reduced charges; mining and obstructing possible landing places; placing field batteries at each end of the straight; forming the nuclei of three or four mobile counter – attack reserve columns upon which the troops, when driven out of Johore, can be based; and employing the entire male civilian population on constructing defence works, the most rigorous compulsion being used.
‘Not only most the defence of Singapore Island be maintained by every means, but the whole island must be fought for until every single unit and every single strongpoint has been separately destroyed. Finally, the city of Singapore must be converted into a citadel and defended to the death. No surrender can be contemplated’.
His exhortations came to late for the defenders of Singapore. The defence works had not been put in hand soon enough. The civilian population was in such disorder that few construction projects could be started. The labourers had fled. Even some of the British and Australian troops had deserted and fled to other islands. There was also a strong fifth-column of Japanese businessmen in Singapore city. The scene was set for a military disaster.
Wavell believed that, even after the loss of Johore, Singapore could hold out for months. By then American reinforcements, including aircraft carriers would be in the area. Such a delay to the Japanese advance would allow time for a spring counter-offensive to be launched from the Dutch East Indies.
Yamashita had other ideas for his 25th Army. He wanted to sweep through the Indies and invade Australia. His key targets were Sydney and Brisbane, and he foresaw no major obstacles to there capture. But first: Singapore. And Yamashita knew that Singapore would have to be taken quickly; otherwise his long-stretched supply lines would be unable to sustain the offensive. His soldiers each had only 100 rounds of ammunition.
On January 31, the last British and Australian troops crossed the long causeway from Johore to the island. They were played across by the only two surviving pipers of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; more than half of the piper’s regiment had been wiper out on the long retreat south.
After the last remnants of the fleeing forces had crossed, charges were set on a bridge section of the 70-foot wide causeway, carrying a road and railway. The causeway was breached. But when the Japanese examined it at low tide, they found that the sunken structure was only four feet underwater. If they wished, they could wade across.
Yamashita set up his forward command post in the tower of the palace of the Sultan of Johore. From there he watched the Japanese air force, outnumbering the Royal air force planes ten to one, pound the British and Australians, who were desperately trying to build up their inadequate defences. Yamashita’s tower was never shelled because it was considered too obvious a target for an enemy to occupy. While the Japanese general watched the action first-hand, Wavell was far away in his Java headquarters, hampered by abysmal communications. The tactics for the defence of Singapore were left in the hands of General Arthur Edward Percival.
Part 2 coming when i finish writting it up
Thought i would write up abit on the Singapore battle so that people could see what happend and whether Percival was responsible.
Part 1
Black rain fell on Singapore on Sunday, February 15, 1942. It fell through clouds of black smoke billowing from the blazing oil storage tanks that the British had ordered to be burnt so that they would not fall into the hands of the invading Japanese. The British would not be needing the oil anymore, for they were surrendering.
The capitulation of the ‘impregnable’ natural fortress island of Singapore as the end of a long invasion road for the Japanese. But it was the end of an even longer road for the British. For when allied troops – outwitted, outfought and outmanoeuvred – handed over Singapore to the Japanese, they were also handing over imperial control in Asia. Above all, they were presaging the end of the British Empire – the destruction of the myth that Britain could protect her far – flung colonies from all corners.
And it need not have been so. When the Japanese invasion force landed and began their long sweep down the Malay Peninsula, they were heavily outnumbered by the British, Australian and Indian Forces who stood in their path. The Japanese, commanded by General Tomoyuki Yamashita, started out with no airfields, no naval cover and an inferior armoury. They made up for it with determination, imagination and brutality.
The Japanese overcame resistance by going around it. Whenever the allies drew up new defensive lines, the Japanese took to the sea in stolen boats and landed further down the coast. The Royal Navy was nowhere to be seen. The promised ships for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, Britain’s primary naval base in the Far East, never arrived. Nor did promised air reinforcements. There was nothing to stop the Japanese.
For most of their journey south towards Singapore, the enemy were able to pedal on bicycles along tracks through what was thought to be impenetrable jungle, guided by no more than school Atlases. At the beginning of February 1942 they arrived along with their captured planes, guns and trucks, at Johore, at the foot of the Malay Peninsula, and looked across the narrow Johore Straight at the stronghold they were determined to win – Singapore.
Singapore is an island about 20 miles long by 10 miles wide, joined to the mainland by a 1,100-yard causeway. To the south of the island, facing out to sea, is Singapore city, people by Malays and Chinese. To the north, facing the mainland was what was then thought to be one of the most important military strong points in the world – the Royal Navy base.
For a century, Singapore had been the cornerstone of British supremacy in the Far East. It was labelled the ‘Gibraltar of the East’ and the ‘Bastion of the British empire’. But it was neither of these. Because of the strange military blindness that seems to have afflicted so many of Britain’s wartime leaders, Singapore was fortified against attack from the sea but was wide open to a landing across the Johore Straight.
Singapore had slumbered for to long to be in any way prepared for the army that was about to overwhelm it. Not until 2 days before Christmas of 1941 did Lt Gen Percival, leader of the British Malaya command, order a survey of the north coast of the island to plan defensive works. No action was taken on his order for 2 weeks.
Winston Churchill was not fully alerted to the risible state of Singapore’s defences until January 16, when he received a telegram about them from General Wavell, who had recently been appointed Supreme commander of the area. Churchill immediately sent and a long and urgent directive to his chiefs of staff: ‘I must confess to being staggered by Wavells telegram…. Merely to have seaward defences and no forts or fixed defences to protect the rear is not to be excused on any ground. I warn you this will be one of the greatest scandals that could possibly be exposed.
‘let a plan be made at once to do the best possible while the battle on Johore is going forward. This plan should comprise; an attempt to use the fortress guns on the northern front by firing reduced charges; mining and obstructing possible landing places; placing field batteries at each end of the straight; forming the nuclei of three or four mobile counter – attack reserve columns upon which the troops, when driven out of Johore, can be based; and employing the entire male civilian population on constructing defence works, the most rigorous compulsion being used.
‘Not only most the defence of Singapore Island be maintained by every means, but the whole island must be fought for until every single unit and every single strongpoint has been separately destroyed. Finally, the city of Singapore must be converted into a citadel and defended to the death. No surrender can be contemplated’.
His exhortations came to late for the defenders of Singapore. The defence works had not been put in hand soon enough. The civilian population was in such disorder that few construction projects could be started. The labourers had fled. Even some of the British and Australian troops had deserted and fled to other islands. There was also a strong fifth-column of Japanese businessmen in Singapore city. The scene was set for a military disaster.
Wavell believed that, even after the loss of Johore, Singapore could hold out for months. By then American reinforcements, including aircraft carriers would be in the area. Such a delay to the Japanese advance would allow time for a spring counter-offensive to be launched from the Dutch East Indies.
Yamashita had other ideas for his 25th Army. He wanted to sweep through the Indies and invade Australia. His key targets were Sydney and Brisbane, and he foresaw no major obstacles to there capture. But first: Singapore. And Yamashita knew that Singapore would have to be taken quickly; otherwise his long-stretched supply lines would be unable to sustain the offensive. His soldiers each had only 100 rounds of ammunition.
On January 31, the last British and Australian troops crossed the long causeway from Johore to the island. They were played across by the only two surviving pipers of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; more than half of the piper’s regiment had been wiper out on the long retreat south.
After the last remnants of the fleeing forces had crossed, charges were set on a bridge section of the 70-foot wide causeway, carrying a road and railway. The causeway was breached. But when the Japanese examined it at low tide, they found that the sunken structure was only four feet underwater. If they wished, they could wade across.
Yamashita set up his forward command post in the tower of the palace of the Sultan of Johore. From there he watched the Japanese air force, outnumbering the Royal air force planes ten to one, pound the British and Australians, who were desperately trying to build up their inadequate defences. Yamashita’s tower was never shelled because it was considered too obvious a target for an enemy to occupy. While the Japanese general watched the action first-hand, Wavell was far away in his Java headquarters, hampered by abysmal communications. The tactics for the defence of Singapore were left in the hands of General Arthur Edward Percival.
Part 2 coming when i finish writting it up
Part 2
Percival decided to stretch his forces along the northern coastline to ward off the Japanese before they could land on the island. Churchill’s idea for a strike force to repulse the enemy once they had landed was not thought by Percival to be the best policy. He knew that the morale of his troops was low and that the morale of the population was even lower. It did not help when soldiers saw the naval base installations that they had fought for so long to protect being blown up by their own side to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese.
Percival had 85000 men on Singapore, 15000 of them non-combatants. Thy faced between 30000 and 50000 crack Japanese troops across the Straight. In terms of firepower, the two sides were well matched. But in all other respects the Japanese held the advantage. They ruled the skies. Their morale was higher: they were elated by victory, and they relished their glorious task of ‘liberating’ Singapore from white colonial domination. They would carry it out with fanatical zeal.
Wavell visited Singapore on January 20 to discuss defence plans with Percival. Wavell said he thought the enemy would land off the north-west of the island. Percival disagreed. He believed the attack would come from the north-east, and he decided to put his freshest troops there. The battered Australians would defend the north-west coastline. On February 8, after days of fierce of air and artillery bombardment, Wavell was proved to have been right.
At 10.30 pm the Japanese landed in the north-west sector, held by the Australian brigade. The coast at that point was covered by searchlights but the troops were told to get them switched off, so as not to give away their positions, until an order to the contrary was issued. But the artillery barrage had cut all the telephone lines, and so the order was never given. The invisible enemy came ashore and formed a strong beachhead. By 3am they were 4 miles inland. The Australians fell back to agreed lines, but in the darkness and confusion, many went astray. A planned counter attack had to be cancelled.
When the news was reported to Percival, he was visibly shaken. But there was worse to come. A further string of landings was reported. Because of lack of communications, units ho feared they were in danger of being encircled pulled out of their strong positions without ever coming under attack. The whole front was falling apart. Finally enemy tanks were sighted south of the causeway and on the main road to Singapore city.
The battle seemed to have been lost within a matter of hours. But the Japanese took time to build up their supplies from across the Strait. By the evening of February 9, about 25000 men had crossed the Johore strait in an armada of tiny boats, rafts and rubber dinghies. Many had swum across. It was a remarkable feat - no less remarkable than the disorganised state of the defending forces. The battle-weary Australians of the 22nd and neighbouring 27th Brigades fought hard, but they were badly organised. With them were the Japanese-hating Chinese civilian defence units, who refused to fall back even when the regular soldiers were ordered to do so.
At one stage of the battle, the Australians prevented further Japanese landing by draining oil storage tanks into the mangrove swamps – then setting them on fire. Many of the enemy were burned alive, and the invasion of the island was delayed. The Japanese took their revenge. They beheaded 200 wounded soldiers.
Then came two major errors, which sealed the fate of Singapore. Just as the Japanese Imperial Guards Division was seeking permission to abandon its positions near the causeway because of intense opposition from a battalion of Australian 27th, the Australians pulled back. The decision has never been explained. But it left a 4000-yard gap through which the enemy poured unimpeded. At the same time, Percival drew up contingency plans which involved falling back to reserve lines around the perimeter of Singapore City. The intention was that plans should be studied but not acted upon. But somewhere along the line the message got garbled – and the Australian 22nd Brigade, which was bearing the brunt of the attack, pulled back to the reserve lines. The 12th Indian Brigade, finding itself isolated, also pulled back to new positions.
On that day, too, the last RAF fighter flew out of Singapore. Had the RAF remained, it was said, it would have been obliterated as Japanese dive bombers wrecked the airfields. Unhindered, the enemy aircraft turned their entire destructive power on Singapore City, with its population doubled by refugees to one million. The closely packed buildings were swept by fire, and the streets literally ran with blood. The water supply was almost entirely cut off by bomber attacks. Bodies lay in gutters. An epidemic was now a certainty.
part 3 later
Percival decided to stretch his forces along the northern coastline to ward off the Japanese before they could land on the island. Churchill’s idea for a strike force to repulse the enemy once they had landed was not thought by Percival to be the best policy. He knew that the morale of his troops was low and that the morale of the population was even lower. It did not help when soldiers saw the naval base installations that they had fought for so long to protect being blown up by their own side to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese.
Percival had 85000 men on Singapore, 15000 of them non-combatants. Thy faced between 30000 and 50000 crack Japanese troops across the Straight. In terms of firepower, the two sides were well matched. But in all other respects the Japanese held the advantage. They ruled the skies. Their morale was higher: they were elated by victory, and they relished their glorious task of ‘liberating’ Singapore from white colonial domination. They would carry it out with fanatical zeal.
Wavell visited Singapore on January 20 to discuss defence plans with Percival. Wavell said he thought the enemy would land off the north-west of the island. Percival disagreed. He believed the attack would come from the north-east, and he decided to put his freshest troops there. The battered Australians would defend the north-west coastline. On February 8, after days of fierce of air and artillery bombardment, Wavell was proved to have been right.
At 10.30 pm the Japanese landed in the north-west sector, held by the Australian brigade. The coast at that point was covered by searchlights but the troops were told to get them switched off, so as not to give away their positions, until an order to the contrary was issued. But the artillery barrage had cut all the telephone lines, and so the order was never given. The invisible enemy came ashore and formed a strong beachhead. By 3am they were 4 miles inland. The Australians fell back to agreed lines, but in the darkness and confusion, many went astray. A planned counter attack had to be cancelled.
When the news was reported to Percival, he was visibly shaken. But there was worse to come. A further string of landings was reported. Because of lack of communications, units ho feared they were in danger of being encircled pulled out of their strong positions without ever coming under attack. The whole front was falling apart. Finally enemy tanks were sighted south of the causeway and on the main road to Singapore city.
The battle seemed to have been lost within a matter of hours. But the Japanese took time to build up their supplies from across the Strait. By the evening of February 9, about 25000 men had crossed the Johore strait in an armada of tiny boats, rafts and rubber dinghies. Many had swum across. It was a remarkable feat - no less remarkable than the disorganised state of the defending forces. The battle-weary Australians of the 22nd and neighbouring 27th Brigades fought hard, but they were badly organised. With them were the Japanese-hating Chinese civilian defence units, who refused to fall back even when the regular soldiers were ordered to do so.
At one stage of the battle, the Australians prevented further Japanese landing by draining oil storage tanks into the mangrove swamps – then setting them on fire. Many of the enemy were burned alive, and the invasion of the island was delayed. The Japanese took their revenge. They beheaded 200 wounded soldiers.
Then came two major errors, which sealed the fate of Singapore. Just as the Japanese Imperial Guards Division was seeking permission to abandon its positions near the causeway because of intense opposition from a battalion of Australian 27th, the Australians pulled back. The decision has never been explained. But it left a 4000-yard gap through which the enemy poured unimpeded. At the same time, Percival drew up contingency plans which involved falling back to reserve lines around the perimeter of Singapore City. The intention was that plans should be studied but not acted upon. But somewhere along the line the message got garbled – and the Australian 22nd Brigade, which was bearing the brunt of the attack, pulled back to the reserve lines. The 12th Indian Brigade, finding itself isolated, also pulled back to new positions.
On that day, too, the last RAF fighter flew out of Singapore. Had the RAF remained, it was said, it would have been obliterated as Japanese dive bombers wrecked the airfields. Unhindered, the enemy aircraft turned their entire destructive power on Singapore City, with its population doubled by refugees to one million. The closely packed buildings were swept by fire, and the streets literally ran with blood. The water supply was almost entirely cut off by bomber attacks. Bodies lay in gutters. An epidemic was now a certainty.
part 3 later
Final part.
On February 10, Wavell flew in from Java for the last time and ordered an immediate counter-attack. Percival resisted the order. But on Wavell’s insistence, the attack went ahead – and failed miserably. It had been launched to late.
Churchill cabled Wavell: ‘I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. Percival is reported to have over 100 000 men, and it is doubtful the Japanese have as many n the whole Malay Peninsula. In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber the Japanese forces and in a well-contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops. The honour of the British Empire and the British Army is at Stake. The whole reputation of our country and our race is involved’.
Churchill’s estimate of 100 000 British troops was an extreme exaggeration, but the war leaders anger got through. Percival told his officers: ‘in some unites, troops have not shown the fighting spirit expected of men of the British Empire. It will be a lasting disgrace if we are defeated by an army of clever gangsters, many times inferior in numbers to our own’.
Wavell also weighed in: ‘it is certain our troops on Singapore heavily outnumber Japanese troops who have crossed the Strait. We must destroy them. Our whole fighting reputation is at stake, and the honour of the British Empire. It will be disgraceful if we yield our boasted fortress of Singapore to inferior enemy forces.’
But the exhortations were in vain. Many of the soldiers, who through the length of the Malay Peninsula had fought so valiantly, had suddenly lost the will to fight. There were disgraceful scenes as armed deserters roamed the streets, looting stores. They even fought women for places on the last small boats leaving Singapore harbour.
The Governor of Singapore, Sir Shenton Thomas, ordered all liquor in the city to be destroyed so that victorious Japanese soldiers would not go on a drunken orgy of murder and rape. Percival ordered the Military Nursing Service to be evacuated by boat so that they would not suffer the usual sordid fate of white women prisoners of the Japanese.
On February 13, Percival called a meeting with Lt Gen Sir Lewis Heath, of the 3rd Indian Corps, and Major-General Gordon Bennett, of the 8th Australian Division. Both said a counter-attack would certainly fail. Both advocated capitulation.
Percival held out, hoping for a miracle – that if the Japanese ran their supplies to low they might have to ease up their barrage that was crippling the city, and that this would allow time for reinforcements to arrive by sea. But on the afternoon of February 15, the Chinese New Year’s Day, he gave up hope. A Japanese plane had dropped a package near his headquarters. It was tied with red and white ribbons, which streamed out behind it as it fell to the ground. Inside was a message from Yamashita. It began: ‘In a spirit of chivalry, we have the honour of advising you to surrender…’
Percival knew the city had only a week’s supplies left, and only a day’s water. He knew that if the fighting continued, tens of thousands of the frightening civilians besieged there would soon be dead. And he took seriously a veiled threat in Yamashita’s note: ‘If you continue resistance, it will be difficult to bear with patience from a humanitarian point of view.’
Under a pall of black smoke and a downpour of blackened rain, Percival drove out of the city to meet his stony faced Japanese counterpart across a table at the islands Ford car assembly plant. There the tall 55-year-old British General unconditionally surrendered the ‘Bastion of the British Empire’.
Yamashita bowed formally – and breathed a secret sigh of relief. He later wrote in his diary: ‘My attack on Singapore was a bluff. I had 30 00 men and was outnumbered more than 3 to 1. I knew that if I had been made to fight longer for Singapore I would have been beaten. That was why the surrender had to be immediate. I was extremely frightened that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting. But they never did. My bluff worked’.
On February 10, Wavell flew in from Java for the last time and ordered an immediate counter-attack. Percival resisted the order. But on Wavell’s insistence, the attack went ahead – and failed miserably. It had been launched to late.
Churchill cabled Wavell: ‘I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. Percival is reported to have over 100 000 men, and it is doubtful the Japanese have as many n the whole Malay Peninsula. In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber the Japanese forces and in a well-contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops. The honour of the British Empire and the British Army is at Stake. The whole reputation of our country and our race is involved’.
Churchill’s estimate of 100 000 British troops was an extreme exaggeration, but the war leaders anger got through. Percival told his officers: ‘in some unites, troops have not shown the fighting spirit expected of men of the British Empire. It will be a lasting disgrace if we are defeated by an army of clever gangsters, many times inferior in numbers to our own’.
Wavell also weighed in: ‘it is certain our troops on Singapore heavily outnumber Japanese troops who have crossed the Strait. We must destroy them. Our whole fighting reputation is at stake, and the honour of the British Empire. It will be disgraceful if we yield our boasted fortress of Singapore to inferior enemy forces.’
But the exhortations were in vain. Many of the soldiers, who through the length of the Malay Peninsula had fought so valiantly, had suddenly lost the will to fight. There were disgraceful scenes as armed deserters roamed the streets, looting stores. They even fought women for places on the last small boats leaving Singapore harbour.
The Governor of Singapore, Sir Shenton Thomas, ordered all liquor in the city to be destroyed so that victorious Japanese soldiers would not go on a drunken orgy of murder and rape. Percival ordered the Military Nursing Service to be evacuated by boat so that they would not suffer the usual sordid fate of white women prisoners of the Japanese.
On February 13, Percival called a meeting with Lt Gen Sir Lewis Heath, of the 3rd Indian Corps, and Major-General Gordon Bennett, of the 8th Australian Division. Both said a counter-attack would certainly fail. Both advocated capitulation.
Percival held out, hoping for a miracle – that if the Japanese ran their supplies to low they might have to ease up their barrage that was crippling the city, and that this would allow time for reinforcements to arrive by sea. But on the afternoon of February 15, the Chinese New Year’s Day, he gave up hope. A Japanese plane had dropped a package near his headquarters. It was tied with red and white ribbons, which streamed out behind it as it fell to the ground. Inside was a message from Yamashita. It began: ‘In a spirit of chivalry, we have the honour of advising you to surrender…’
Percival knew the city had only a week’s supplies left, and only a day’s water. He knew that if the fighting continued, tens of thousands of the frightening civilians besieged there would soon be dead. And he took seriously a veiled threat in Yamashita’s note: ‘If you continue resistance, it will be difficult to bear with patience from a humanitarian point of view.’
Under a pall of black smoke and a downpour of blackened rain, Percival drove out of the city to meet his stony faced Japanese counterpart across a table at the islands Ford car assembly plant. There the tall 55-year-old British General unconditionally surrendered the ‘Bastion of the British Empire’.
Yamashita bowed formally – and breathed a secret sigh of relief. He later wrote in his diary: ‘My attack on Singapore was a bluff. I had 30 00 men and was outnumbered more than 3 to 1. I knew that if I had been made to fight longer for Singapore I would have been beaten. That was why the surrender had to be immediate. I was extremely frightened that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting. But they never did. My bluff worked’.