Alongside the spiritual and psychological preparedness of the Japanese soldier during the interwar era and throughout WW2, the recruitment, conscription and training of a ‘heavenly warrior’ remained paramount to sustaining the Japanese soldier during this period. The process that turned the Japanese soldier into the excellent fighter that he was took place, as it did in most western armies, during the interwar years. In fact it was from 1919 to 1937 that the Japanese army underwent a swift modernisation process that transformed it from an army that thought solely in terms of the bayonet to one capable of fighting a fully mechanised, combined arms battle.
Recruitment and conscription
Even before a Japanese soldier entered the army, he had already undergone years of inculcation as a warrior for the Emperor. In Japan, primarily after the Restoration in 1868, military indoctrination took place from infancy. Formal regimentation and training began at about the age of 8 when, starting with the third year of primary school or the third grade, all males were given semi-military training by their teachers, who themselves were primarily former military men or reservists. Those going on to middle school, higher school, college or university then received further military training under the tutelage of Regular army officers. From the end of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 up to the eve of Japanese involvement in WW2 in 1941, this amounted to any where from two or more hours a week training, with four to six days devoted to annual manoeuvres. As time went on, the subject matter became increasingly orientated towards purely military subjects. Those youths who did not elect to further their education continued their training in what were called youth schools, or seinen Gakko, set up by the government to reinforce their primary school military training. Special emphasis was given to training paratroops and to aviation-related subjects. In time, the government added numerous courses of a purely military nature in order to turn middle schools into training camps for cadets, and the universities and higher schools into military academies to train reserve officers and NCOs.
The basis for the Japanese conscription and recruitment systems dated back to before WW1, when German advisers introduced these systems during the last two decades of the 19th century. In theory, all eligible males between 17 and 40 years old could be called to serve, although in reality this never occurred, as the average age of the Japanese soldier was 20 years old. During the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), all young men aged 20 were examined by a council reform in each town or village. All eligible recruits averaging 1.52m (5ft) or more in height were then divided into three categories. The first class of conscript normally served 2 years of active service, the first class of reserve four years and four months, the second class of reserves 10 years, and finally, the territorial reserve 17 years and four months.
Conscripts serving in the second class were assigned a special formation called ‘conscript reserves’, similar in training to German pre WW1 Ersatz organisations and system of training. Unlike those assigned to the first two categories of active and first class reserve service, the second-class reservists underwent only a short period of training. Recruits assigned to the third class of reserves went immediately into the territorial reserve. Those recruits, who fell under the required height of 1.52m and averaged in height at around 1.4 (4ft 7in), or were unable to meet the annual call-up due to injury or illness, were immediately assigned to the territorial reserves until the next years call up.
to be continued.......................
Recruitment, conscription and training
Moderator: Tanaka
Recruitment, conscription and training
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
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At that time they were either accepted for service or permanently rejected. Thus only a portion of those eligible for call up served at any one time. Those men who were classified as either unfit for military service or who were between the ages of 37 and 40, as well as teenagers aged from 17 to 20, were automatically placed into the national conscript category. While men falling into this category received little, if any, training, they nonetheless were liable for service in an extreme emergency. As WW2 drew to a close, like its German ally, the Japanese army began to rely on this body of manpower to fill the ranks and possibly to assist in the defence of the home islands themselves in the event of an allied landing.
During the interwar era, the average strength of the Japanese army stood at around 300 000 officers and men. During the time of call up for military service, which was in January of every year, the Japanese army normally stood at an annual strength of 500 000 conscripts and 100 000 men from those temporarily rejected the previous year. After undergoing a prearranged period of initial training, which lasted approximately 6 months and consisted of physical training, bayonet training, field training, company and platoon tactics, forced marching, close order drill, musketry and the inculcation of the soldiers code – the recruits then passed on to advanced training. This training was carried out by veteran NCOs or company grade officers, usually captains or Lieutenants. The Japanese soldier, whether a commissioned officer or enlisted man, was taught from the outset that he was expected to endure all types of hardships and that he should therefore live a Spartan life. His food was simple, as were his living conditions, which were extremely puritanical.
After completing this training, the Japanese soldier was assigned to a permanent regiment. Much like the German regimental system, the newly arrived recruit received additional training in the barracks square of his assigned company. Here, the soldier was acquainted with all aspects of the duties and responsibilities of being a warrior for the emperor. Charged with this training were career serving NCOs and officers, primarily company grade officers, who further instilled a sense of loyalty into the soldier, with the greatest attention being paid to the seven military values of loyalty, valour, patriotism, obedience, humility, morality and honour. Japanese army training during this era can be summed up as progressive in nature and was one that was both tough and demanding on the individual soldier.
At the end of June of every year, the regiment left the barracks and carried out company -, battalion-, regimental-, brigade- and finally, divisional-level training. This training culminated in the annual autumn manoeuvres, where as many as from 2 to 8 divisions participated. These manoeuvres were very strenuous and included a great deal of forced marching with full packs or kits. These forced marches averaged 30-40 miles a day and were undertaken in sunshine or rain, at night and during the day. Great emphasis was placed upon successfully completing the march.
Neither the officer nor the enlisted man enjoyed much in the way of relaxation and little time was given to the playing of sports. While officers engaged in two-handed fencing, enlisted men participated in bayonet fighting, ju-jitsu and wrestling.
NCOs in the Japanese army came from conscripts who had served three months active service in the army and received an additional nine months of special training with troops, whereupon they became NCO candidates known as Kashikan Kohosha. They were then given a one-year period of training (shortened during WW”) at one of the NCO schools (kyodo Gakko) or at one of the army branch schools or service schools. NCOs, many of whom had made the army a career, included first Sergeants and corporals. Each NCO had extensive service within the army or had been highly trained for a particular branch. Each one also had equal responsibility in training the men under his care, as did the officers.
Apprentice system
In order to meet the demand for highly trained technicians and other specialists, the army adopted an apprentice system (Rikugun Shonenhei). Youths from 14 to 15 years of age were recruited and given basic military training before being inducted into the army as what the Japanese army officials called ‘youth soldier’. After a probationary period of six months, these young soldiers, given the rank of superior private or lance corporal, were then promoted to rank of corporal after graduation from a branch school. These youth soldiers then attended their particular branch school, primarily in the fields of aviation, signals, tank, artillery and ordnance.
During the 1920s, the Seinendan (youth training centres) became an important source of trained manpower. These centres – established by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi and army Minister General Ugaki Kazushige, both classmates at the Japanese war college, in unison with the Minister for education Okada Ryohei – further militarised the education of Japanese youth. Army drill instructors were now sent to middle schools to instil patriotism, physical fitness and loyalty among Japan’s burgeoning male population. By Mid-July 1926, the youth training centres were in full operation.
Initially, they were administered and financed by the education ministry, with approximately 40 000 of the 110 000instructors being army reservists. Students were required to undertake about 400 hours of house drill. Local army regimental commanders were responsible for inspecting the state of the student’s military proficiency. From 1926 until the end of WW2, the army worked through both the youth training centres and education ministry in order to train future officers and NCOs. These centres were located throughout the home islands in major army districts of administration, in order to coordinate and facilitate the activities of the local regimental commanders.
The Japanese army likewise used the centres for military drill and patriotic training, and the youth association branches for broader military, physical, patriotic training, in order to maintain strong army-community ties. This relationship enabled the army to recruit students for the youth training centres. In time some communities went as far as to relinquish their drill responsibilities to the Seinendan.
As for the numbers of Japanese youths trained in the Seinendans, figures show that, during their first year of operation, they trained more than 800 000 male teenagers, with the numbers growing steadily from then on. By 1934, more than one-third, or 915 000, of Japan’s young men in appropriate age bracket studied and drilled at these youth training centres. It is not surprising therefore, that by the time a Japanese soldier entered basic training he was already accustomed to military life.
Throughout the course of training, special attention was given to inculcation of ‘morale’ or spiritual instruction. Japanese officers often read the imperial rescript to soldiers (issued by emperor Meiji on 4 January 1882) to enlisted men and constantly emphasised the seven principles of military ethics.
As for length of training, first and second conscript reserves underwent a six-month period of training. The training was not as intensive as that given to active service men, but it did attempt to cover, in a relatively short period of time, all that the active service men learned in their two-year course. During peacetime, men who had served their requisite two years of active service with the army or Genekihei, and had subsequently been relegated to the first reserve, were required to undergo further military training from time to time during their period of liability. During WW2, the subsequent drain on trained manpower ended the minimum periods of training. This meant that Japanese recruits were literally sent direct from the training depots to the front lines, where they received on the job training. Even during peacetime, however, Japanese army conscripts received the bulk of their training in operational areas. This was particularly true in China and Manchuria, where the Japanese High Command used both theatres to train their men in various combat skills. Often, recruits sent to operational theatres either remained in garrison or, in some instances, were sent into the field to experience actual combat their period of training.
During wartime, the Japanese soldier served that western armies called ‘for the duration’, although technically service had been extended from the pre war two year stint to a wartime length of three years. Certain individuals who possessed a technical or specialist skill were often granted deferments, especially those who worked in the airplane, ordnance or munitions factories. In order to make up this deficit, the Japanese army began to draft Koreans (from 1944) and Taiwanese (in early 1945). While the Japanese employed a few of these colonial conscripts as combat troops against allied forces during WW2, the vast majority of them served as military labourers and were thus given little, if any, combat training. In the case of the Koreans, it is interesting to note that many of the post-WW2 Republic of Korea military leaders actually trained as Japanese army officers in Manchuria. As for Taiwan, the Japanese managed to conscript approximately 315 00 natives, although few, if any, served in actual war, as it ended before they could be trained to fight.
to be continued.................
During the interwar era, the average strength of the Japanese army stood at around 300 000 officers and men. During the time of call up for military service, which was in January of every year, the Japanese army normally stood at an annual strength of 500 000 conscripts and 100 000 men from those temporarily rejected the previous year. After undergoing a prearranged period of initial training, which lasted approximately 6 months and consisted of physical training, bayonet training, field training, company and platoon tactics, forced marching, close order drill, musketry and the inculcation of the soldiers code – the recruits then passed on to advanced training. This training was carried out by veteran NCOs or company grade officers, usually captains or Lieutenants. The Japanese soldier, whether a commissioned officer or enlisted man, was taught from the outset that he was expected to endure all types of hardships and that he should therefore live a Spartan life. His food was simple, as were his living conditions, which were extremely puritanical.
After completing this training, the Japanese soldier was assigned to a permanent regiment. Much like the German regimental system, the newly arrived recruit received additional training in the barracks square of his assigned company. Here, the soldier was acquainted with all aspects of the duties and responsibilities of being a warrior for the emperor. Charged with this training were career serving NCOs and officers, primarily company grade officers, who further instilled a sense of loyalty into the soldier, with the greatest attention being paid to the seven military values of loyalty, valour, patriotism, obedience, humility, morality and honour. Japanese army training during this era can be summed up as progressive in nature and was one that was both tough and demanding on the individual soldier.
At the end of June of every year, the regiment left the barracks and carried out company -, battalion-, regimental-, brigade- and finally, divisional-level training. This training culminated in the annual autumn manoeuvres, where as many as from 2 to 8 divisions participated. These manoeuvres were very strenuous and included a great deal of forced marching with full packs or kits. These forced marches averaged 30-40 miles a day and were undertaken in sunshine or rain, at night and during the day. Great emphasis was placed upon successfully completing the march.
Neither the officer nor the enlisted man enjoyed much in the way of relaxation and little time was given to the playing of sports. While officers engaged in two-handed fencing, enlisted men participated in bayonet fighting, ju-jitsu and wrestling.
NCOs in the Japanese army came from conscripts who had served three months active service in the army and received an additional nine months of special training with troops, whereupon they became NCO candidates known as Kashikan Kohosha. They were then given a one-year period of training (shortened during WW”) at one of the NCO schools (kyodo Gakko) or at one of the army branch schools or service schools. NCOs, many of whom had made the army a career, included first Sergeants and corporals. Each NCO had extensive service within the army or had been highly trained for a particular branch. Each one also had equal responsibility in training the men under his care, as did the officers.
Apprentice system
In order to meet the demand for highly trained technicians and other specialists, the army adopted an apprentice system (Rikugun Shonenhei). Youths from 14 to 15 years of age were recruited and given basic military training before being inducted into the army as what the Japanese army officials called ‘youth soldier’. After a probationary period of six months, these young soldiers, given the rank of superior private or lance corporal, were then promoted to rank of corporal after graduation from a branch school. These youth soldiers then attended their particular branch school, primarily in the fields of aviation, signals, tank, artillery and ordnance.
During the 1920s, the Seinendan (youth training centres) became an important source of trained manpower. These centres – established by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi and army Minister General Ugaki Kazushige, both classmates at the Japanese war college, in unison with the Minister for education Okada Ryohei – further militarised the education of Japanese youth. Army drill instructors were now sent to middle schools to instil patriotism, physical fitness and loyalty among Japan’s burgeoning male population. By Mid-July 1926, the youth training centres were in full operation.
Initially, they were administered and financed by the education ministry, with approximately 40 000 of the 110 000instructors being army reservists. Students were required to undertake about 400 hours of house drill. Local army regimental commanders were responsible for inspecting the state of the student’s military proficiency. From 1926 until the end of WW2, the army worked through both the youth training centres and education ministry in order to train future officers and NCOs. These centres were located throughout the home islands in major army districts of administration, in order to coordinate and facilitate the activities of the local regimental commanders.
The Japanese army likewise used the centres for military drill and patriotic training, and the youth association branches for broader military, physical, patriotic training, in order to maintain strong army-community ties. This relationship enabled the army to recruit students for the youth training centres. In time some communities went as far as to relinquish their drill responsibilities to the Seinendan.
As for the numbers of Japanese youths trained in the Seinendans, figures show that, during their first year of operation, they trained more than 800 000 male teenagers, with the numbers growing steadily from then on. By 1934, more than one-third, or 915 000, of Japan’s young men in appropriate age bracket studied and drilled at these youth training centres. It is not surprising therefore, that by the time a Japanese soldier entered basic training he was already accustomed to military life.
Throughout the course of training, special attention was given to inculcation of ‘morale’ or spiritual instruction. Japanese officers often read the imperial rescript to soldiers (issued by emperor Meiji on 4 January 1882) to enlisted men and constantly emphasised the seven principles of military ethics.
As for length of training, first and second conscript reserves underwent a six-month period of training. The training was not as intensive as that given to active service men, but it did attempt to cover, in a relatively short period of time, all that the active service men learned in their two-year course. During peacetime, men who had served their requisite two years of active service with the army or Genekihei, and had subsequently been relegated to the first reserve, were required to undergo further military training from time to time during their period of liability. During WW2, the subsequent drain on trained manpower ended the minimum periods of training. This meant that Japanese recruits were literally sent direct from the training depots to the front lines, where they received on the job training. Even during peacetime, however, Japanese army conscripts received the bulk of their training in operational areas. This was particularly true in China and Manchuria, where the Japanese High Command used both theatres to train their men in various combat skills. Often, recruits sent to operational theatres either remained in garrison or, in some instances, were sent into the field to experience actual combat their period of training.
During wartime, the Japanese soldier served that western armies called ‘for the duration’, although technically service had been extended from the pre war two year stint to a wartime length of three years. Certain individuals who possessed a technical or specialist skill were often granted deferments, especially those who worked in the airplane, ordnance or munitions factories. In order to make up this deficit, the Japanese army began to draft Koreans (from 1944) and Taiwanese (in early 1945). While the Japanese employed a few of these colonial conscripts as combat troops against allied forces during WW2, the vast majority of them served as military labourers and were thus given little, if any, combat training. In the case of the Koreans, it is interesting to note that many of the post-WW2 Republic of Korea military leaders actually trained as Japanese army officers in Manchuria. As for Taiwan, the Japanese managed to conscript approximately 315 00 natives, although few, if any, served in actual war, as it ended before they could be trained to fight.
to be continued.................
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
NCOs
Like its western counterparts, the Japanese army prided itself on its long term NCOs. Starting with its sergeants major, (socho) and sergeants (gunso), and ending with the rank of corporal (gocho), Japanese NCOs received a thorough, albeit very narrow and rigid, education. Japanese army officials aimed this education primarily at training infantry and combat arms leaders. NCOs, started with the rank of corporal, attended one of the four NCO academies or Kyodo Gakko, located at Sendai, Kumamoto, Toyohashi and Kunungchuling (Manchuria). These NCO academies were primarily devoted to infantry, with the exception of some schools focusing on artillery, armour, cavalry, engineering, veterinary, medical and ordnance. Normally, the NCOs attending the latter were required to have had some civilian training in either maintenance or technical skills such as mechanics, signals or telephone repair. Some of these NCOs attended one of the apprentice schools previously mentioned. Japanese NCOs likewise attended special courses at the tank school, military police, medical school, the various air schools and the mechanised equipment maintenance school.
Officer recruitment and training
There were tow classifications of Japanese officers: regular army officers and reserve officers. Separate to this were the special volunteer officers known as Tokubetsu Shigan Shoko and warrant officers known as Junshikans, the regular and reserve officers: (a) those who graduated from the full course at the Japanese military academy; (b) those who obtained commissions either through the reserve officers candidate course after having served in the ranks or direct from a technical institution; and (c) former warrant officers and NCOs who had risen from the ranks. No matter where they came from, all Japanese officers, both regular and reserve, served a probationary period that lasted from 2 to 6 months after the completion of there training.
Regular army officers were further broken down according to their training. Those Japanese males who graduated from the main military academy (the Japanese version of sandhurst or west point) or the air academy usually entered the line branches such as the infantry, artillery, cavalry, armour and aviation units. The graduates of the technical and scientific schools served in the support and technical services. Most of these officers had been selected prior to entering the army and had been students when chosen for a particular branch. They were usually educated at government expense at specified universities and colleges offering a particular curriculum. University graduates received their commissions as first lieutenants.
The third category included selected warrant and NCOs in active service under 38 years of age, who became candidates for commissions. These officers were known officially as Shoi Kohosha and received a one-year course of instruction at the military academy, the air academy, the military police school or one of the army schools. In peacetime, they rarely advanced beyond the rank of captain, as they were so close to retirement age.
Reserve officers were made up of Class A reserve officer candidates (Koshu Kambu Kohosei) who met the requirements of regular officers. They were drawn primarily from regular army conscripts who had certain educational qualifications (mostly 2 years of high school). After three months of intensive training with their respective units, they became candidates; after a further three months of training, they were classified by examination into A candidates (those suitable for officer commission and B candidates (those suitable to be appointed as NCOs).
After having been selected, the A candidates were then sent to one of the regular courses for reserve officer candidates. Upon receiving a peacetime commission, they were placed into the reserves by army officials. From this point they were called into active service (known as Shoshu Shoko). It is important to note that during WW2 it was from this category that the bulk of Japanese officers would come.
The special volunteer officers (Tokubetsu Shigan Shoko) came primarily from field and company grade officers (second lieutenant to colonel), and had been permitted to volunteer for active service for a period of two years, and for one-year periods after that, up to retirement age. During WW2, this designation was given to all young reserve officer candidates after they had served a probationary period with troops. Special volunteer officers often qualified for a one-year course at the military academy. Successful completion of this course would entitle them to become volunteer regular officers and also offered them the possibility of riding to the rank of Major in the regular army.
The last category of officers came from the warrant officers, or Junshikans. These were selected by the promotion of qualified NCOs, and came primarily from the technical fields, as well as combat support (artillery, cavalry, tanks, medicine and signal branches). The actual training of a young officer was a rigid as, if not more so than, that of an ordinary soldier. Besides the emphasis on infantry tactics, field problems, drill and swordsmanship, the officer candidate received a heavy amount of indoctrination training. Above all else, Japanese officers were taught from the outset their position on the battlefield was always in front of the troops.
Like Western armies during the same era, the Japanese authorities endeavoured to insure that officers were of appropriate age for their respective grades. Minimum time limits in grade were established as follows: from sub lieutenant (subaltern or second lieutenant) to lieutenant and from lieutenant to captain was tow years; captain to major, four years; major to lieutenant-colonel, three years; lieutenant-colonel to colonel and colonel to brigadier-general, two years; brigadier-general to major general, four years. Corps commanders and field marshals were personally selected by the Emperor. To this end, age limits were established to ensure the ability and fitness required for army officers. The maximum age for field officers and general officers was 50 years for majors, 53 years for lieutenant-colonels, 55years for colonels, 58 years for brigadier-generals, 62 years for major-generals and 65 years for corps commanders. There was no prescribed limit for field marshals.
Like its western counterparts, the Japanese army prided itself on its long term NCOs. Starting with its sergeants major, (socho) and sergeants (gunso), and ending with the rank of corporal (gocho), Japanese NCOs received a thorough, albeit very narrow and rigid, education. Japanese army officials aimed this education primarily at training infantry and combat arms leaders. NCOs, started with the rank of corporal, attended one of the four NCO academies or Kyodo Gakko, located at Sendai, Kumamoto, Toyohashi and Kunungchuling (Manchuria). These NCO academies were primarily devoted to infantry, with the exception of some schools focusing on artillery, armour, cavalry, engineering, veterinary, medical and ordnance. Normally, the NCOs attending the latter were required to have had some civilian training in either maintenance or technical skills such as mechanics, signals or telephone repair. Some of these NCOs attended one of the apprentice schools previously mentioned. Japanese NCOs likewise attended special courses at the tank school, military police, medical school, the various air schools and the mechanised equipment maintenance school.
Officer recruitment and training
There were tow classifications of Japanese officers: regular army officers and reserve officers. Separate to this were the special volunteer officers known as Tokubetsu Shigan Shoko and warrant officers known as Junshikans, the regular and reserve officers: (a) those who graduated from the full course at the Japanese military academy; (b) those who obtained commissions either through the reserve officers candidate course after having served in the ranks or direct from a technical institution; and (c) former warrant officers and NCOs who had risen from the ranks. No matter where they came from, all Japanese officers, both regular and reserve, served a probationary period that lasted from 2 to 6 months after the completion of there training.
Regular army officers were further broken down according to their training. Those Japanese males who graduated from the main military academy (the Japanese version of sandhurst or west point) or the air academy usually entered the line branches such as the infantry, artillery, cavalry, armour and aviation units. The graduates of the technical and scientific schools served in the support and technical services. Most of these officers had been selected prior to entering the army and had been students when chosen for a particular branch. They were usually educated at government expense at specified universities and colleges offering a particular curriculum. University graduates received their commissions as first lieutenants.
The third category included selected warrant and NCOs in active service under 38 years of age, who became candidates for commissions. These officers were known officially as Shoi Kohosha and received a one-year course of instruction at the military academy, the air academy, the military police school or one of the army schools. In peacetime, they rarely advanced beyond the rank of captain, as they were so close to retirement age.
Reserve officers were made up of Class A reserve officer candidates (Koshu Kambu Kohosei) who met the requirements of regular officers. They were drawn primarily from regular army conscripts who had certain educational qualifications (mostly 2 years of high school). After three months of intensive training with their respective units, they became candidates; after a further three months of training, they were classified by examination into A candidates (those suitable for officer commission and B candidates (those suitable to be appointed as NCOs).
After having been selected, the A candidates were then sent to one of the regular courses for reserve officer candidates. Upon receiving a peacetime commission, they were placed into the reserves by army officials. From this point they were called into active service (known as Shoshu Shoko). It is important to note that during WW2 it was from this category that the bulk of Japanese officers would come.
The special volunteer officers (Tokubetsu Shigan Shoko) came primarily from field and company grade officers (second lieutenant to colonel), and had been permitted to volunteer for active service for a period of two years, and for one-year periods after that, up to retirement age. During WW2, this designation was given to all young reserve officer candidates after they had served a probationary period with troops. Special volunteer officers often qualified for a one-year course at the military academy. Successful completion of this course would entitle them to become volunteer regular officers and also offered them the possibility of riding to the rank of Major in the regular army.
The last category of officers came from the warrant officers, or Junshikans. These were selected by the promotion of qualified NCOs, and came primarily from the technical fields, as well as combat support (artillery, cavalry, tanks, medicine and signal branches). The actual training of a young officer was a rigid as, if not more so than, that of an ordinary soldier. Besides the emphasis on infantry tactics, field problems, drill and swordsmanship, the officer candidate received a heavy amount of indoctrination training. Above all else, Japanese officers were taught from the outset their position on the battlefield was always in front of the troops.
Like Western armies during the same era, the Japanese authorities endeavoured to insure that officers were of appropriate age for their respective grades. Minimum time limits in grade were established as follows: from sub lieutenant (subaltern or second lieutenant) to lieutenant and from lieutenant to captain was tow years; captain to major, four years; major to lieutenant-colonel, three years; lieutenant-colonel to colonel and colonel to brigadier-general, two years; brigadier-general to major general, four years. Corps commanders and field marshals were personally selected by the Emperor. To this end, age limits were established to ensure the ability and fitness required for army officers. The maximum age for field officers and general officers was 50 years for majors, 53 years for lieutenant-colonels, 55years for colonels, 58 years for brigadier-generals, 62 years for major-generals and 65 years for corps commanders. There was no prescribed limit for field marshals.
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
Field and weapons training
Japanese army infantry training progressed from the smallest unit, the squad, to platoon, company, battalion and regimental training, and culminated in combined manoeuvres at the end of every year. During the second year of duty, training was similar in scope, but with more time devoted to specialist training in the respective branch to which a soldier might find himself assigned. As for the quality of this training, Japanese infantry training was progressive and gradualistic in process, growing in both intensity and scope. Japanese soldiers conducted long marches with full equipment and endured stiff endurance tests; military officials considered these necessary to produce in the soldier the ability to withstand hunger and fatigue for long periods.
One myth that requires clarification is the long held belief that the Japanese soldier was a good jungle fighter. While the statement in itself is true, the fact remained that the Japanese infantryman had been trained to fight in all climates and places, a factor that dominated his conditioning in training. Furthermore, if anything, the Japanese soldier had been trained to fight primarily what would be termed a conventional war, much in the style of the western front during WW1. Indeed the fighting techniques employed by the Japanese soldier during WW2, particularly during the long war in china, had first been used during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.
Japanese soldiers were trained to endure all types of hardships, in all climates and over all types of terrain. Most important was the training in mountain and cold weather warfare, carried out in Northern Japan, Korea and on Formosa (Taiwan). There, Japanese infantrymen conducted snow marches, which lasted four to five days, were normally conducted towards the end of January or during the first week of February, when the weather in northern Japan was at its coldest. As part of the hardening process, Japanese soldiers on sentry duty were not permitted to wear gloves, while bivouacking was carried out at night and in the open. The main objective of this conditioning was to accustom both officers and enlisted men to the cold. During July and August, Japanese soldiers were sent on long conditioning marches in order to accustom them to the heat. In these and other ways, Japanese troops were trained to endure extremes of temperature, basic living conditions and hardships of all kinds.
As a means of reinforcing this sparten existence, the Japanese diet and accommodations were both simple and practical. The Japanese soldiers diet normally consisted of a large bowl of rice, a cup of green tea, a plate of Japanese pickles, smoked fish and fried bean paste or some other local delicacy, such as fruits and vegetables. The Japanese mess room consisted of a large, plain table with wooden benches mounted on an uncarpeted, planked wooden floor. Usually, a large banner or script was posted that exhorted loyalty to the Emperor or listed one of the seven military virtues.
As to the types of training the Japanese infantrymen underwent, it is sufficient to say that it was both varied and thorough. Japanese officers maintained, however, that soldiers trained in the outlying garrisons in the country received better field training than did those stationed in urban areas. At Wakamtsu, for instance, in the countryside, the terrain was ideal for varied tactical manoeuvres, night marches, field firing with live ammunition, exercises in fording rivers, building bridges, bivouacking, trench construction and other important training that soldiers could not undergo in the city due to restrictions on the available terrain for training.
Nonetheless, there was both uniformity in method and purpose in the training of a Japanese soldier, all of which better prepared him for war. This included training in such areas as bayonet fighting, camouflage, patrolling, night manoeuvres, musketry, marching, field hygiene and sanitation, first aid and military innovation. Broken down individually, each aspect in the training of a Japanese soldier for war was designed to prepare the infantryman for modern twentieth century warfare, while at the same time, maintaining the code of Bushido.
Bayonet training
Above all else, Japanese military authorities stressed bayonet training. In fact, Japanese infantrymen were taught from the beginning of their training that the bayonet was the weapon of the infantry and that with it, and only with it, could the enemy be forced to give ground. The individual soldier was constantly reminded by his officers and NCOs that the ultimate result is sought in the assault and that the bayonet is the ultimate factor in every assault. Because the ‘spirit’ of the Japanese army was the spirit of the offensive, Japanese infantry instructors repeatedly emphasised that the bayonet was essentially the weapon of the offensive. To ensure the soldier was effective in its use, Japanese manuals stressed that the infantryman must be ‘confident, skilled and without fear, and that … he must have absolute confidence in his weapon and in himself.’ With this in mind Japanese infantry constantly trained and practised in the nurturing of the ‘spirit of the bayonet’. A large part of the instruction in bayonet training was devoted to personal combat. Here the spirit of Ju-jitsu, or mind over matter, came into play, as the Japanese soldier was constantly reminded that in battle he must often defeat man after man until either he himself is either defeated or killed by his enemy. In order to promote defeat of the enemy with the bayonet, Japanese bayonet instructors – usually civilian bayonet and sword fencing masters – stressed the long thrust to the exclusion of all other forms of attack, while the butt of the rifle was seldom, if ever, concentrated upon. Japanese soldiers were taught that, if the first long thrust failed, they were to drop their rifles and close with the enemy, using their hands and feet. Likewise, in combat, there is no time for fencing with an opponent, so the Japanese soldier was encouraged to aim first for the abdomen and then for the throat. The attack was to be made in pairs as far as possible. As the Japanese soldier became skilled in night fighting, his instructors stressed the use of the bayonet. To this end, night manoeuvres were carried out with unsheathed bayonets in order to accustom the men to handling the rifle in darkness.
Due largely to the lessons learned during the Russo-Japanese war, as well as WW1, Japanese soldiers were taught offensive and defensive trench warfare tactics, which included use of the bayonet. Here, trainers developed what they call a ‘trench run’, which was essentially a trench dug approximately 12ft deep and 8ft wide, across which soldiers were required to charge. One soldier was to bend over, while his companion leapt upon his back and scrambled over the top with their rifles still held in their right hands. The sides of the trench had a slope of about three degrees, revetted with a series of poles interwoven with reeds in order for the soldiers to use as a grip to exit the trench in a hurry.
Once the soldier exited the first trench line, he then proceeded to the next one, where he met a belt of barbed wire about 50ft deep. The job of the first three men to reach the wire, which was about 3ft in height, was to throw themselves as far forwards into the wire as possible and begin cutting it from the bottom. They could then crawl underneath the wire as they cleared a path for their comrades. The first man to throw himself over the wire was to lay his rifle over it in front of him, while the man proceeding him leapt on the back of the former onto the rifle, and from there on, deeper into the wire. This method was repeatably used by Japanese soldiers during WW2, particularly when there was no artillery support to clear enemy barbed wire. Storming barbed wire in this fashion reduced the time necessary to cut through the first 15ft of enemy wire.
The emphasis on bayonet training was extended to all categories of Japanese conscripts and reserves. In fact, even students in high schools, colleges and universities who reported for their annual three weeks of military duty with their regiment received a considerable amount of bayonet training. At least half an hour each day in the training schedule of a Japanese soldier revolved around use of a bayonet and a series of personal combats; at least another 30 minutes was given to instruction on the bayonet run, where students and regular soldiers alike practised bayonet assaults over broken terrain, through barbed wire and over such obstacles.
Japanese army infantry training progressed from the smallest unit, the squad, to platoon, company, battalion and regimental training, and culminated in combined manoeuvres at the end of every year. During the second year of duty, training was similar in scope, but with more time devoted to specialist training in the respective branch to which a soldier might find himself assigned. As for the quality of this training, Japanese infantry training was progressive and gradualistic in process, growing in both intensity and scope. Japanese soldiers conducted long marches with full equipment and endured stiff endurance tests; military officials considered these necessary to produce in the soldier the ability to withstand hunger and fatigue for long periods.
One myth that requires clarification is the long held belief that the Japanese soldier was a good jungle fighter. While the statement in itself is true, the fact remained that the Japanese infantryman had been trained to fight in all climates and places, a factor that dominated his conditioning in training. Furthermore, if anything, the Japanese soldier had been trained to fight primarily what would be termed a conventional war, much in the style of the western front during WW1. Indeed the fighting techniques employed by the Japanese soldier during WW2, particularly during the long war in china, had first been used during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.
Japanese soldiers were trained to endure all types of hardships, in all climates and over all types of terrain. Most important was the training in mountain and cold weather warfare, carried out in Northern Japan, Korea and on Formosa (Taiwan). There, Japanese infantrymen conducted snow marches, which lasted four to five days, were normally conducted towards the end of January or during the first week of February, when the weather in northern Japan was at its coldest. As part of the hardening process, Japanese soldiers on sentry duty were not permitted to wear gloves, while bivouacking was carried out at night and in the open. The main objective of this conditioning was to accustom both officers and enlisted men to the cold. During July and August, Japanese soldiers were sent on long conditioning marches in order to accustom them to the heat. In these and other ways, Japanese troops were trained to endure extremes of temperature, basic living conditions and hardships of all kinds.
As a means of reinforcing this sparten existence, the Japanese diet and accommodations were both simple and practical. The Japanese soldiers diet normally consisted of a large bowl of rice, a cup of green tea, a plate of Japanese pickles, smoked fish and fried bean paste or some other local delicacy, such as fruits and vegetables. The Japanese mess room consisted of a large, plain table with wooden benches mounted on an uncarpeted, planked wooden floor. Usually, a large banner or script was posted that exhorted loyalty to the Emperor or listed one of the seven military virtues.
As to the types of training the Japanese infantrymen underwent, it is sufficient to say that it was both varied and thorough. Japanese officers maintained, however, that soldiers trained in the outlying garrisons in the country received better field training than did those stationed in urban areas. At Wakamtsu, for instance, in the countryside, the terrain was ideal for varied tactical manoeuvres, night marches, field firing with live ammunition, exercises in fording rivers, building bridges, bivouacking, trench construction and other important training that soldiers could not undergo in the city due to restrictions on the available terrain for training.
Nonetheless, there was both uniformity in method and purpose in the training of a Japanese soldier, all of which better prepared him for war. This included training in such areas as bayonet fighting, camouflage, patrolling, night manoeuvres, musketry, marching, field hygiene and sanitation, first aid and military innovation. Broken down individually, each aspect in the training of a Japanese soldier for war was designed to prepare the infantryman for modern twentieth century warfare, while at the same time, maintaining the code of Bushido.
Bayonet training
Above all else, Japanese military authorities stressed bayonet training. In fact, Japanese infantrymen were taught from the beginning of their training that the bayonet was the weapon of the infantry and that with it, and only with it, could the enemy be forced to give ground. The individual soldier was constantly reminded by his officers and NCOs that the ultimate result is sought in the assault and that the bayonet is the ultimate factor in every assault. Because the ‘spirit’ of the Japanese army was the spirit of the offensive, Japanese infantry instructors repeatedly emphasised that the bayonet was essentially the weapon of the offensive. To ensure the soldier was effective in its use, Japanese manuals stressed that the infantryman must be ‘confident, skilled and without fear, and that … he must have absolute confidence in his weapon and in himself.’ With this in mind Japanese infantry constantly trained and practised in the nurturing of the ‘spirit of the bayonet’. A large part of the instruction in bayonet training was devoted to personal combat. Here the spirit of Ju-jitsu, or mind over matter, came into play, as the Japanese soldier was constantly reminded that in battle he must often defeat man after man until either he himself is either defeated or killed by his enemy. In order to promote defeat of the enemy with the bayonet, Japanese bayonet instructors – usually civilian bayonet and sword fencing masters – stressed the long thrust to the exclusion of all other forms of attack, while the butt of the rifle was seldom, if ever, concentrated upon. Japanese soldiers were taught that, if the first long thrust failed, they were to drop their rifles and close with the enemy, using their hands and feet. Likewise, in combat, there is no time for fencing with an opponent, so the Japanese soldier was encouraged to aim first for the abdomen and then for the throat. The attack was to be made in pairs as far as possible. As the Japanese soldier became skilled in night fighting, his instructors stressed the use of the bayonet. To this end, night manoeuvres were carried out with unsheathed bayonets in order to accustom the men to handling the rifle in darkness.
Due largely to the lessons learned during the Russo-Japanese war, as well as WW1, Japanese soldiers were taught offensive and defensive trench warfare tactics, which included use of the bayonet. Here, trainers developed what they call a ‘trench run’, which was essentially a trench dug approximately 12ft deep and 8ft wide, across which soldiers were required to charge. One soldier was to bend over, while his companion leapt upon his back and scrambled over the top with their rifles still held in their right hands. The sides of the trench had a slope of about three degrees, revetted with a series of poles interwoven with reeds in order for the soldiers to use as a grip to exit the trench in a hurry.
Once the soldier exited the first trench line, he then proceeded to the next one, where he met a belt of barbed wire about 50ft deep. The job of the first three men to reach the wire, which was about 3ft in height, was to throw themselves as far forwards into the wire as possible and begin cutting it from the bottom. They could then crawl underneath the wire as they cleared a path for their comrades. The first man to throw himself over the wire was to lay his rifle over it in front of him, while the man proceeding him leapt on the back of the former onto the rifle, and from there on, deeper into the wire. This method was repeatably used by Japanese soldiers during WW2, particularly when there was no artillery support to clear enemy barbed wire. Storming barbed wire in this fashion reduced the time necessary to cut through the first 15ft of enemy wire.
The emphasis on bayonet training was extended to all categories of Japanese conscripts and reserves. In fact, even students in high schools, colleges and universities who reported for their annual three weeks of military duty with their regiment received a considerable amount of bayonet training. At least half an hour each day in the training schedule of a Japanese soldier revolved around use of a bayonet and a series of personal combats; at least another 30 minutes was given to instruction on the bayonet run, where students and regular soldiers alike practised bayonet assaults over broken terrain, through barbed wire and over such obstacles.
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New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
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''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
Musketry training
Musketry training in the Japanese army was aimed primarily at NCOs, who were charged with the application of the principles of collective rifle fire in battle. In collective rifle fire, the teamwork could be exceptional, although the accuracy of individual soldier decreased rapidly at ranges over 264m (300yd). Japanese NCOs were trained in the estimation of ranges by eyesight and thoroughly familiarised with the conditions that affected the appearance of targets, such as light and terrain, background, depressions, darkness and climate conditions such as rain, cloud and fog. They likewise received careful training in the estimation of distance by the observation of fire. In China and Manchuria, where the ground was dry and usually dusty, training in range estimation was very effective, as rifle fire often found its target. In addition to training in rifle fire, Japanese heavy machine gunners were schooled in the use of range cards when their unit was on the defence.
During WW2, Japanese soldiers were not known for their accuracy in shooting at individual targets, but were said to be more effective at hitting moving targets. This was where Japanese musketry training had placed its greatest emphasis during advanced infantry training before the advent of war in the 1930s. An added feature of the Japanese marksmanship training was in the use of surprise targets; soldiers were likewise taught to fire by sections, so increasing the probability of hits. A normal Japanese army rifle section consisted of 2 rifle squads, and a light machine gun squad. The six sections of both peace and wartime strength rifle companies were organised to bring maximum firepower to bear against the enemy.
Scouting and patrolling
Scouting and patrolling were heavily emphasised during training and in war. In fact, one US army observer with the Japanese army during the 1920s wrote: ‘scouting and patrolling in the Japanese army has been reduced to an exact science in which no detail is to minute to be overlooked or slighted either by instructors or pupils in practice or by scouts and patrols in time of war’.
This same US army observer noted that the small stature and excellent eyesight made the Japanese soldier extremely efficient in scouting and patrolling. Individual scouts received very careful training in their duties. In fact, only the most intelligent men of a section were trained as scouts. As this same observer noted, however, Japanese scouts were poorly trained in such skills as map reading and sketching. While critics noted that these were essential skills for a scout, Japanese training emphasised actual observation of the enemy in determining his position, strength, rates of march and what arms of service and wheeled vehicles the enemy force had in its possession, rather than map reading. As the Japanese demonstrated in Burma and in the South-West Pacific, particularly on Guadalcanal, New Britain and New Guinea, its scouts proved to be second to none, as they consistently outmanoeuvred their British, American and Australian pursuers. In fact, Japanese soldiers were know throughout the Pacific war to posses a keen sense of observation, and the army took special pride in its systematic training in observation techniques and the development of the natural abilities of the ordinary soldier in this area.
Japanese scouts were always trained to reconnoitre to the front and flanks of assaulting platoons, although they were noted used when platoons were ordered to flank an enemy point of resistance.
The thinking here was the use of scouts in this type of operation was more likely to tip off the enemy and thus negate the element of surprise. Thus, they would rather move forwards by scout reconnaissance. In the scouts training, special emphasis was given to the need to transmit information to the rear at once that would seem to indicate movement on the part of the enemy, such as preparations for a counter-attack. Scouts were also instructed to report when the assault units were held up or driven back, or when any enemy breakthrough occurred in the assaulting unit’s lines.
All scouts were masters of camouflage. Each army scout carried his own green netting, which he filled with grass, weeds, branches or twigs of trees and then through over his head to provide all-round cover and concealment. Japanese soldiers were trained to use the surrounding terrain to determine the most effective means of camouflage protection. With the aid of such cover and concealment, Japanese scouts were reportably trained to penetrate within 27m (30yd) of an enemy’s frontline positions without being observed. In this area of camouflage, the Japanese soldier was trained to take advantage of any surrounding grass or scrub brush.
As for patrolling techniques, Japanese soldiers received excellent training, which emphasised teamwork above all else. In fact, teamwork between members of a Japanese army patrol were said to be excellent. Soldiers were taught to move out in single file or as a line of skirmishers. Unlike American patrolling methods, the use of the ‘diamond’ technique was discouraged, nor did Japanese patrols divide into two parallel columns as US marines practised and used in the Caribbean and in Nicaragua in the 1920s. Patrol formations were’ in fact, usually quite compact when moving through woods or villages. The patrol leader was always on point or at the head of the column with no rear guard. Another important factor was that, by and large, the Japanese discouraged the use of patrols. When patrol actions were ordered, the Japanese army had a fondness for assigning officers to lead patrols, unlike in western armies, where a sergeant or corporal was assigned to lead such a mission. The commander of any point of any detachment of any size was always a commissioned officer. In addition, half of all combat patrols and at least one-third of all reconnaissance patrols were led by commissioned officers during WW2.
Musketry training in the Japanese army was aimed primarily at NCOs, who were charged with the application of the principles of collective rifle fire in battle. In collective rifle fire, the teamwork could be exceptional, although the accuracy of individual soldier decreased rapidly at ranges over 264m (300yd). Japanese NCOs were trained in the estimation of ranges by eyesight and thoroughly familiarised with the conditions that affected the appearance of targets, such as light and terrain, background, depressions, darkness and climate conditions such as rain, cloud and fog. They likewise received careful training in the estimation of distance by the observation of fire. In China and Manchuria, where the ground was dry and usually dusty, training in range estimation was very effective, as rifle fire often found its target. In addition to training in rifle fire, Japanese heavy machine gunners were schooled in the use of range cards when their unit was on the defence.
During WW2, Japanese soldiers were not known for their accuracy in shooting at individual targets, but were said to be more effective at hitting moving targets. This was where Japanese musketry training had placed its greatest emphasis during advanced infantry training before the advent of war in the 1930s. An added feature of the Japanese marksmanship training was in the use of surprise targets; soldiers were likewise taught to fire by sections, so increasing the probability of hits. A normal Japanese army rifle section consisted of 2 rifle squads, and a light machine gun squad. The six sections of both peace and wartime strength rifle companies were organised to bring maximum firepower to bear against the enemy.
Scouting and patrolling
Scouting and patrolling were heavily emphasised during training and in war. In fact, one US army observer with the Japanese army during the 1920s wrote: ‘scouting and patrolling in the Japanese army has been reduced to an exact science in which no detail is to minute to be overlooked or slighted either by instructors or pupils in practice or by scouts and patrols in time of war’.
This same US army observer noted that the small stature and excellent eyesight made the Japanese soldier extremely efficient in scouting and patrolling. Individual scouts received very careful training in their duties. In fact, only the most intelligent men of a section were trained as scouts. As this same observer noted, however, Japanese scouts were poorly trained in such skills as map reading and sketching. While critics noted that these were essential skills for a scout, Japanese training emphasised actual observation of the enemy in determining his position, strength, rates of march and what arms of service and wheeled vehicles the enemy force had in its possession, rather than map reading. As the Japanese demonstrated in Burma and in the South-West Pacific, particularly on Guadalcanal, New Britain and New Guinea, its scouts proved to be second to none, as they consistently outmanoeuvred their British, American and Australian pursuers. In fact, Japanese soldiers were know throughout the Pacific war to posses a keen sense of observation, and the army took special pride in its systematic training in observation techniques and the development of the natural abilities of the ordinary soldier in this area.
Japanese scouts were always trained to reconnoitre to the front and flanks of assaulting platoons, although they were noted used when platoons were ordered to flank an enemy point of resistance.
The thinking here was the use of scouts in this type of operation was more likely to tip off the enemy and thus negate the element of surprise. Thus, they would rather move forwards by scout reconnaissance. In the scouts training, special emphasis was given to the need to transmit information to the rear at once that would seem to indicate movement on the part of the enemy, such as preparations for a counter-attack. Scouts were also instructed to report when the assault units were held up or driven back, or when any enemy breakthrough occurred in the assaulting unit’s lines.
All scouts were masters of camouflage. Each army scout carried his own green netting, which he filled with grass, weeds, branches or twigs of trees and then through over his head to provide all-round cover and concealment. Japanese soldiers were trained to use the surrounding terrain to determine the most effective means of camouflage protection. With the aid of such cover and concealment, Japanese scouts were reportably trained to penetrate within 27m (30yd) of an enemy’s frontline positions without being observed. In this area of camouflage, the Japanese soldier was trained to take advantage of any surrounding grass or scrub brush.
As for patrolling techniques, Japanese soldiers received excellent training, which emphasised teamwork above all else. In fact, teamwork between members of a Japanese army patrol were said to be excellent. Soldiers were taught to move out in single file or as a line of skirmishers. Unlike American patrolling methods, the use of the ‘diamond’ technique was discouraged, nor did Japanese patrols divide into two parallel columns as US marines practised and used in the Caribbean and in Nicaragua in the 1920s. Patrol formations were’ in fact, usually quite compact when moving through woods or villages. The patrol leader was always on point or at the head of the column with no rear guard. Another important factor was that, by and large, the Japanese discouraged the use of patrols. When patrol actions were ordered, the Japanese army had a fondness for assigning officers to lead patrols, unlike in western armies, where a sergeant or corporal was assigned to lead such a mission. The commander of any point of any detachment of any size was always a commissioned officer. In addition, half of all combat patrols and at least one-third of all reconnaissance patrols were led by commissioned officers during WW2.
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
alright bit more for tonight
Field or ‘Forced’ marching
The great stress placed upon toughness and endurance meant that the Japanese army emphasised marching in its training programme. This was despite the numerous problems the Japanese soldier was forced to endure because of ill-fitting leather boots. On many occasions in the course of a training or combat march, a soldier would discard his boots and replace them with straw sandals, which he carried in his field pack and put on during one of his many halts during the length of a forced hike.
The pace of the march was always decided upon prior to the start and was strictly adhered to regardless of how difficult it was to maintain. Companies remained fairly well closed up and any soldier or officer who fell out of the march was dealt with severely. One British observer attached to the Japanese army during the 1920s noted that, in one instance, a Japanese officer who had fallen out through sheer exhaustion committed suicide by Hara-kiri in ‘order to wipe out what he considered to be an irretrievable disgrace’. Company commanders usually marched at the rear of the column during a march, with either a second or first lieutenant leading the column. Halts were conducted every 50 minutes of hiking, with a 10-minute break thereafter in order to allow the men to change their socks or drink water.
Field Hygiene
The Japanese soldier strictly adhered to proper field sanitation. While in garrison, barracks were meticulously cleaned and blankets and bedding was aired every day. The Japanese army mover primarily on foot, so great attention was paid to the treatment of fee, and socks were changed twice a day whenever possible. All soldiers were required to bathe, in both summer and winter, and were likewise ordered to change their underwear every or every other day. Those charged with the preparation of rations were inspected daily by their commanding officers to ensure that their hands, fingernails and clothing were kept clean.
Field Medicine
Despite the fact that Japanese soldiers often went untreated for wounds, or were left behind by their comrades, they received thorough instruction in the administration of first aid to fallen comrades. Japanese soldiers received lectures on where arteries were located and in the application of tourniquets and other means of stopping heavy bleeding. They could also treat sprains, fractures and dislocations of bones. Japanese infantrymen likewise knew basic antidotes for snakebites and insect bites, as well as for other infectious poisons mostly associated with jungle warfare. Japanese soldiers were skilled in the correct application of bandages to wounds and knew how to prevent the wound becoming infected.
Most important, however, was the fact that the Japanese soldier knew how to deal with sunstroke. He could also improvise from materials at hand and make a portable litter from coats, blankets, tents or other articles of clothing and equipment as the situation dictated. In short, as one US army observer noted after witnessing a field exercise: ‘ the Japanese soldier had a better knowledge of first aid than the American soldier possesses’.
Rations
In the field and on the march, the Japanese soldier’s ration consisted of milled wheat and rice, and apportioned to seven portions of rice to three of wheat per soldier. This was then mixed up and placed in a large cauldron or pot, and was served to the men three times a day. This was also the staple diet in garrison, although it was often supplemented with other delicacies. Japanese soldiers were given bread once a week, although this was not compulsory. In fact, Japanese soldiers, like most Asians, had little liking for bread and instead preferred to eat rice or wheat for their starch supplement. Soldiers drank green tea or hot water with all three meals.
Field or ‘Forced’ marching
The great stress placed upon toughness and endurance meant that the Japanese army emphasised marching in its training programme. This was despite the numerous problems the Japanese soldier was forced to endure because of ill-fitting leather boots. On many occasions in the course of a training or combat march, a soldier would discard his boots and replace them with straw sandals, which he carried in his field pack and put on during one of his many halts during the length of a forced hike.
The pace of the march was always decided upon prior to the start and was strictly adhered to regardless of how difficult it was to maintain. Companies remained fairly well closed up and any soldier or officer who fell out of the march was dealt with severely. One British observer attached to the Japanese army during the 1920s noted that, in one instance, a Japanese officer who had fallen out through sheer exhaustion committed suicide by Hara-kiri in ‘order to wipe out what he considered to be an irretrievable disgrace’. Company commanders usually marched at the rear of the column during a march, with either a second or first lieutenant leading the column. Halts were conducted every 50 minutes of hiking, with a 10-minute break thereafter in order to allow the men to change their socks or drink water.
Field Hygiene
The Japanese soldier strictly adhered to proper field sanitation. While in garrison, barracks were meticulously cleaned and blankets and bedding was aired every day. The Japanese army mover primarily on foot, so great attention was paid to the treatment of fee, and socks were changed twice a day whenever possible. All soldiers were required to bathe, in both summer and winter, and were likewise ordered to change their underwear every or every other day. Those charged with the preparation of rations were inspected daily by their commanding officers to ensure that their hands, fingernails and clothing were kept clean.
Field Medicine
Despite the fact that Japanese soldiers often went untreated for wounds, or were left behind by their comrades, they received thorough instruction in the administration of first aid to fallen comrades. Japanese soldiers received lectures on where arteries were located and in the application of tourniquets and other means of stopping heavy bleeding. They could also treat sprains, fractures and dislocations of bones. Japanese infantrymen likewise knew basic antidotes for snakebites and insect bites, as well as for other infectious poisons mostly associated with jungle warfare. Japanese soldiers were skilled in the correct application of bandages to wounds and knew how to prevent the wound becoming infected.
Most important, however, was the fact that the Japanese soldier knew how to deal with sunstroke. He could also improvise from materials at hand and make a portable litter from coats, blankets, tents or other articles of clothing and equipment as the situation dictated. In short, as one US army observer noted after witnessing a field exercise: ‘ the Japanese soldier had a better knowledge of first aid than the American soldier possesses’.
Rations
In the field and on the march, the Japanese soldier’s ration consisted of milled wheat and rice, and apportioned to seven portions of rice to three of wheat per soldier. This was then mixed up and placed in a large cauldron or pot, and was served to the men three times a day. This was also the staple diet in garrison, although it was often supplemented with other delicacies. Japanese soldiers were given bread once a week, although this was not compulsory. In fact, Japanese soldiers, like most Asians, had little liking for bread and instead preferred to eat rice or wheat for their starch supplement. Soldiers drank green tea or hot water with all three meals.
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
Gas Warfare
Two important lessoned learned by the Japanese from WW1 was the importance of gas warfare and the subsequent necessity of being able to operate in that type of battlefield environment. In December 1926, the Japanese army held a large three-day manoeuvre with toxic gases at the army’s Engineer school, located 12 miles from Tokyo. According to published reports, the exercise’s main aims was to test the efficiency of the offensive and defensive qualities of the different types of war gases prepared by its army research laboratory under field conditions. During this exercise, the Japanese troops tested the effect of these toxic substances on various laboratory animals. Later, army officials emphasised that the main purposes of this exercise were not only ‘improve the Japanese army’s toxic gas services’ as a whole, but also ‘ formulate a practical plan for the employment of chemicals in aid to and against airplanes and artillery’. Reports formulated at the conclusion of the exercise noted that the ‘results obtained in this exercise showed a marked improvement over those obtained in the recent gas manoeuvre’ a few months earlier on 20-24 August 1926 at Asashikawa. A US army observer reported: ‘the above exercise demonstrates the fact the Japanese army posses agents which have proved satisfactory in the laboratory, the research into which had reached the point where the field test was necessary’. The observer went on to note that ‘the selection of the army engineer school as the place for the exercise undoubtedly was due to the fact that the school possesses considerable meteorological equipment’. It also underscored the later war concerns of the dedicated Japanese efforts to employ toxic weapons on the battlefield especially in China.
Combined arms and manoeuvres
While the Japanese army had been organised by and large along European lines, and the lessons of WW1 had been studied with keen interest, it nonetheless maintained that the lessons of the late war were inconclusive as to the value of modern arms and equipment in attack. Much of what the Japanese had learned had been copied from the experiences of Great Britain, Germany and France, as well as from their own experiences in the Russo-Japanese war. One of the foremost characteristics of Japanese manoeuvres was the fact that they were strenuous and realistic, and that Japanese military officials demanded the best from their men at all times.
During the interwar era, when most Japanese tactical and operational doctrine was formulated, manoeuvres stressed realism. While for the Japanese, manoeuvres remained an important part in any army’s training, the 1925 and 1926 army manoeuvres proved decisive in the Japanese army’s evolution as a modern combat force. The 1925 manoeuvres held in late September, consisted of a joint army-navy exercises in and around Tokyo. During this exercise, more than 60 planes, several observation balloons, 2 infantry regiments, 2 brigades of cavalry, 1 regiment of field artillery, 1 battalion of horse artillery, engineers and automobile corps took part in one of the biggest manoeuvres to date. The aim of this particular exercise was the defence of Tokyo and the harbour from a hostile landing force. Later that same year tow divisions took part in joint manoeuvres. The significance of both manoeuvres was the extensive use of air power and mechanised assets, and the fact they laid the basis for the grand manoeuvres of 1926.
Bt far the most significant, and perhaps the most important, manoeuvres during the interwar era were held between 19 and 21 November 1926, when two reinforced divisions opposed each other in a two-sided exercise. The exercise involved an unopposed river crossing using pontoon bridges, a meeting engagement, withdrawal to defensive positions and a pursuit which resulted in reconnaissance and development of a hostile line, followed by an attack on an enemies position.
The most significant features of this exercise were the new weapons that appeared for the first time during the manoeuvres, pointing to the growing sophistication of the Japanese army and the influence of WW1 on Japanese army doctrine. These included for the first time tank, smoke, gas, wireless telephone and tractor drawn artillery. Also, the infantry used newer mortars, one pounder field guns and light and heavy machine guns, all of which were comparatively new models. The US army observers to this manoeuvre reported: ‘the artillery weapons, generally models produced following the war with Russia, are not, as a real, up to as high a standard as post war guns in other countries’. The observers noted with interest that certain weapons, such as tanks and motorised vehicles, were primarily of foreign design: the heavy tank used by the Japanese was the British ‘C’ model, while the light tanks were French Renaults. As for motor transport, Japanese forces used American motorcycles and British trucks, which were part of the tank company’s organic equipment. Air planes used by the Japanese army air force included Salmsons and Nieuports.
Triangular Organisation
As for infantry organisation, the observers noted that the Japanese infantry regiment was organised on a triangular basis and consisted on three battalions of four rifle companies and one machine gun Company. These observers likewise noted that this triangular organisation, which had made its first appearance during the 1922 manoeuvres, had been retained. The regiment contained a mortar detachment and one pounders, two of each gun being used by the regiment during the manoeuvres. Each rifle company was said to have six light machine guns, while the machine gun companies had four heavy machine guns. The number of machineguns of both types and infantry guns was increased according to wartime tables of organisation. At the review conducted following the manoeuvre, the foreign observers noted that each infantry company was about 120 strong.
As for tactics, the observers noted that the Japanese infantry, when on the offensive was characterised by a deliberate reconnaissance, an enveloping attack and an inevitable counter-attack. The firing line was reinforced as rapidly as possible during the attack and the advance pushed as far forwards as possible using the bayonet. In fact, given the ‘spirit of the bayonet’ ingrained in every Japanese soldier, their commanders often ‘rushed’ into launching the assault using the bayonet charge.
Despite the overriding employment of the bayonet amongst the ranks of the Japanese army, the employment of firepower – namely the full use of machine guns – was not overlooked. In fact, every effort was made during the manoeuvres to keep the machine guns, both light and heavy, well up to the front, while at the same time making good use of overhead fire.
Two important lessoned learned by the Japanese from WW1 was the importance of gas warfare and the subsequent necessity of being able to operate in that type of battlefield environment. In December 1926, the Japanese army held a large three-day manoeuvre with toxic gases at the army’s Engineer school, located 12 miles from Tokyo. According to published reports, the exercise’s main aims was to test the efficiency of the offensive and defensive qualities of the different types of war gases prepared by its army research laboratory under field conditions. During this exercise, the Japanese troops tested the effect of these toxic substances on various laboratory animals. Later, army officials emphasised that the main purposes of this exercise were not only ‘improve the Japanese army’s toxic gas services’ as a whole, but also ‘ formulate a practical plan for the employment of chemicals in aid to and against airplanes and artillery’. Reports formulated at the conclusion of the exercise noted that the ‘results obtained in this exercise showed a marked improvement over those obtained in the recent gas manoeuvre’ a few months earlier on 20-24 August 1926 at Asashikawa. A US army observer reported: ‘the above exercise demonstrates the fact the Japanese army posses agents which have proved satisfactory in the laboratory, the research into which had reached the point where the field test was necessary’. The observer went on to note that ‘the selection of the army engineer school as the place for the exercise undoubtedly was due to the fact that the school possesses considerable meteorological equipment’. It also underscored the later war concerns of the dedicated Japanese efforts to employ toxic weapons on the battlefield especially in China.
Combined arms and manoeuvres
While the Japanese army had been organised by and large along European lines, and the lessons of WW1 had been studied with keen interest, it nonetheless maintained that the lessons of the late war were inconclusive as to the value of modern arms and equipment in attack. Much of what the Japanese had learned had been copied from the experiences of Great Britain, Germany and France, as well as from their own experiences in the Russo-Japanese war. One of the foremost characteristics of Japanese manoeuvres was the fact that they were strenuous and realistic, and that Japanese military officials demanded the best from their men at all times.
During the interwar era, when most Japanese tactical and operational doctrine was formulated, manoeuvres stressed realism. While for the Japanese, manoeuvres remained an important part in any army’s training, the 1925 and 1926 army manoeuvres proved decisive in the Japanese army’s evolution as a modern combat force. The 1925 manoeuvres held in late September, consisted of a joint army-navy exercises in and around Tokyo. During this exercise, more than 60 planes, several observation balloons, 2 infantry regiments, 2 brigades of cavalry, 1 regiment of field artillery, 1 battalion of horse artillery, engineers and automobile corps took part in one of the biggest manoeuvres to date. The aim of this particular exercise was the defence of Tokyo and the harbour from a hostile landing force. Later that same year tow divisions took part in joint manoeuvres. The significance of both manoeuvres was the extensive use of air power and mechanised assets, and the fact they laid the basis for the grand manoeuvres of 1926.
Bt far the most significant, and perhaps the most important, manoeuvres during the interwar era were held between 19 and 21 November 1926, when two reinforced divisions opposed each other in a two-sided exercise. The exercise involved an unopposed river crossing using pontoon bridges, a meeting engagement, withdrawal to defensive positions and a pursuit which resulted in reconnaissance and development of a hostile line, followed by an attack on an enemies position.
The most significant features of this exercise were the new weapons that appeared for the first time during the manoeuvres, pointing to the growing sophistication of the Japanese army and the influence of WW1 on Japanese army doctrine. These included for the first time tank, smoke, gas, wireless telephone and tractor drawn artillery. Also, the infantry used newer mortars, one pounder field guns and light and heavy machine guns, all of which were comparatively new models. The US army observers to this manoeuvre reported: ‘the artillery weapons, generally models produced following the war with Russia, are not, as a real, up to as high a standard as post war guns in other countries’. The observers noted with interest that certain weapons, such as tanks and motorised vehicles, were primarily of foreign design: the heavy tank used by the Japanese was the British ‘C’ model, while the light tanks were French Renaults. As for motor transport, Japanese forces used American motorcycles and British trucks, which were part of the tank company’s organic equipment. Air planes used by the Japanese army air force included Salmsons and Nieuports.
Triangular Organisation
As for infantry organisation, the observers noted that the Japanese infantry regiment was organised on a triangular basis and consisted on three battalions of four rifle companies and one machine gun Company. These observers likewise noted that this triangular organisation, which had made its first appearance during the 1922 manoeuvres, had been retained. The regiment contained a mortar detachment and one pounders, two of each gun being used by the regiment during the manoeuvres. Each rifle company was said to have six light machine guns, while the machine gun companies had four heavy machine guns. The number of machineguns of both types and infantry guns was increased according to wartime tables of organisation. At the review conducted following the manoeuvre, the foreign observers noted that each infantry company was about 120 strong.
As for tactics, the observers noted that the Japanese infantry, when on the offensive was characterised by a deliberate reconnaissance, an enveloping attack and an inevitable counter-attack. The firing line was reinforced as rapidly as possible during the attack and the advance pushed as far forwards as possible using the bayonet. In fact, given the ‘spirit of the bayonet’ ingrained in every Japanese soldier, their commanders often ‘rushed’ into launching the assault using the bayonet charge.
Despite the overriding employment of the bayonet amongst the ranks of the Japanese army, the employment of firepower – namely the full use of machine guns – was not overlooked. In fact, every effort was made during the manoeuvres to keep the machine guns, both light and heavy, well up to the front, while at the same time making good use of overhead fire.
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
Tank Usage
The employment of tanks during manoeuvres took place first in 1926. This was the beginning of the Japanese army’s interest in manoeuvre warfare. It must be emphasised, however, that during the interwar era and WW2 the tank was used mainly in a single role in the Japanese army focusing primarily on infantry support. In only as few as a handful of cases during the pacific war, specifically on Saipan and on Peleliu in 1944, did the Japanese use tanks in massed formations. As both the manoeuvres and actions during the war indicated, problems remained with command and control. Also, another problem centred on the liaison between infantry and artillery which, the observers noted with some candour, hardly existed. These officers noted that all messages for support were sent through divisional headquarters to the divisional artillery group, instead of from the battalion or regimental commander. This seemingly unnecessary diversion often meant a critical delay in artillery support for the attacking troops.
Another problem centred on communications with aircraft. As in most western armies – and certainly with the US marines in the jungles of Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua during the 1920s – the Japanese utilised the simple but dated method of colour-coded panels in order to coordinate air- and ground cooperation during an attack against the enemy.
The Japanese commanders were slow to use the new technology of wireless telephones, which were so effective on behalf of their enemies in their air to ground and ground communications in WW21.
As already mentioned, the Japanese began to employ on an experimental basis in manoeuvres both gas and smoke during an attack. By 1926, these elements had become standard features of Japanese military exercises. With the commencement of the manoeuvres in 1926, the Japanese began employing motor vehicles for the effective movement of both troops and artillery. Despite this dependence on vehicles, however, the Japanese infantry division retained its use of animal transport and still to rely on its horses to pull supplies and artillery pieces to and from the battlefield during this period.
In fact, in the Japanese army in particular, pack animals were the rule, not the exception when it came to transporting equipment such as infantry guns, machine guns and communications gear. Despite this, the Japanese seemed to be able to cover good ground. Even though they were travelling primarily by foot and animal transport, Japanese infantry divisions were said to be able to march distances between 30 and 40 miles per day under good conditions.
One lat lesson of the 1926 manoeuvres and the interwar era as a whole was the extensive use of reserves. During this particular manoeuvres, a substantial number of reserves were used as a part of both field forces. This served to indicate how seriously the Japanese army took the necessity of an adequately trained reserve force. During wartime, it was these troops who would become the primary source of trained manpower for the army and other branches of the armed forces.
One goal
Each phase of the Japanese army’s preparations during the interwar era had but one goal, and this was the recruitment, conscription and preparedness of a well-trained force of infantrymen. These soldiers would receive a heavy dose both of military training and military indoctrination. The process was ongoing, from elementary school through to university or college level, and this continuity of training and indoctrination was to ay off, for it would give the Japanese army a large reservoir of trained officers and soldiers during WW2.
Inculcated during his initial periods of training with the ‘spirit of the warrior’, or Bushido, in time the Japanese soldier would become one of the best trained – and without a doubt, one of the most fanatical – warriors ever faced by the armies of the US, China, Great Britain, Australia, the Soviet Union and New Zealand.
It is an undisputable fact that the Japanese army was to remain primarily and infantry dominated force during WW2. It must be kept in mind that it was only against the Soviet Union and China, and on some of the Pacific Islands in the central Pacific, that the Japanese used armoured and mechanised forces.
For the most part, the slugging matches that took place in Guadalcanal, Burma, New Guinea and the central Pacific remained primarily infantry battles. It was in these battles that the Japanese soldier would prove himself to be both resourceful and tenacious, despite the odds, which were stacked against him. All of this was a result of his training and the inculcation of the ‘warriors’ code during the era between the wars.
thats the end of it then. Thanks for reading
The employment of tanks during manoeuvres took place first in 1926. This was the beginning of the Japanese army’s interest in manoeuvre warfare. It must be emphasised, however, that during the interwar era and WW2 the tank was used mainly in a single role in the Japanese army focusing primarily on infantry support. In only as few as a handful of cases during the pacific war, specifically on Saipan and on Peleliu in 1944, did the Japanese use tanks in massed formations. As both the manoeuvres and actions during the war indicated, problems remained with command and control. Also, another problem centred on the liaison between infantry and artillery which, the observers noted with some candour, hardly existed. These officers noted that all messages for support were sent through divisional headquarters to the divisional artillery group, instead of from the battalion or regimental commander. This seemingly unnecessary diversion often meant a critical delay in artillery support for the attacking troops.
Another problem centred on communications with aircraft. As in most western armies – and certainly with the US marines in the jungles of Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua during the 1920s – the Japanese utilised the simple but dated method of colour-coded panels in order to coordinate air- and ground cooperation during an attack against the enemy.
The Japanese commanders were slow to use the new technology of wireless telephones, which were so effective on behalf of their enemies in their air to ground and ground communications in WW21.
As already mentioned, the Japanese began to employ on an experimental basis in manoeuvres both gas and smoke during an attack. By 1926, these elements had become standard features of Japanese military exercises. With the commencement of the manoeuvres in 1926, the Japanese began employing motor vehicles for the effective movement of both troops and artillery. Despite this dependence on vehicles, however, the Japanese infantry division retained its use of animal transport and still to rely on its horses to pull supplies and artillery pieces to and from the battlefield during this period.
In fact, in the Japanese army in particular, pack animals were the rule, not the exception when it came to transporting equipment such as infantry guns, machine guns and communications gear. Despite this, the Japanese seemed to be able to cover good ground. Even though they were travelling primarily by foot and animal transport, Japanese infantry divisions were said to be able to march distances between 30 and 40 miles per day under good conditions.
One lat lesson of the 1926 manoeuvres and the interwar era as a whole was the extensive use of reserves. During this particular manoeuvres, a substantial number of reserves were used as a part of both field forces. This served to indicate how seriously the Japanese army took the necessity of an adequately trained reserve force. During wartime, it was these troops who would become the primary source of trained manpower for the army and other branches of the armed forces.
One goal
Each phase of the Japanese army’s preparations during the interwar era had but one goal, and this was the recruitment, conscription and preparedness of a well-trained force of infantrymen. These soldiers would receive a heavy dose both of military training and military indoctrination. The process was ongoing, from elementary school through to university or college level, and this continuity of training and indoctrination was to ay off, for it would give the Japanese army a large reservoir of trained officers and soldiers during WW2.
Inculcated during his initial periods of training with the ‘spirit of the warrior’, or Bushido, in time the Japanese soldier would become one of the best trained – and without a doubt, one of the most fanatical – warriors ever faced by the armies of the US, China, Great Britain, Australia, the Soviet Union and New Zealand.
It is an undisputable fact that the Japanese army was to remain primarily and infantry dominated force during WW2. It must be kept in mind that it was only against the Soviet Union and China, and on some of the Pacific Islands in the central Pacific, that the Japanese used armoured and mechanised forces.
For the most part, the slugging matches that took place in Guadalcanal, Burma, New Guinea and the central Pacific remained primarily infantry battles. It was in these battles that the Japanese soldier would prove himself to be both resourceful and tenacious, despite the odds, which were stacked against him. All of this was a result of his training and the inculcation of the ‘warriors’ code during the era between the wars.
thats the end of it then. Thanks for reading
JRA site http://www.japanesereenacting.co.uk/
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''
New Japanese reenactors forum
http://s13.invisionfree.com/IJA_Reenacting/
''i think the phrase ryhmes with clucking bell''