U-921

[Tychsen]

U-921 made three patrols and sank no Allied shipping.
She was laid down in October 1941 and was sunk in September 1944 SW of Bear Island.
On 18th May 44 she sailed from Trondheim one of a nhumber of submarines heading for sea at that time.
On 24th may she was attacked by a Sunderland from 422 RCAF which was operating from Sullom Voe - R/422 ( DV990) commanded by F/O. George Holly.
The guncrew shot Holly's aircraft down as it made its run in - a sighting report had been sent - picked up by a nearby Sunderland from 423 - also operating from Sullom Voe - this crew captained by Ft/Lt Nesbitt saw a splash some 15 miles away and flew to investigate - they sighted a surfaced U-Boat and overflew some wreckage on the way in. They dropped a pattern of charges which missed the submarine , when they came around for a second run the U-Boatw as going down.
In the exchange of fire the guncrew was wounded and her captain sent the boat down closing the hatch from topside , he was lolst but in doing so he saved his crew.
The action took place in grid square AF5748 - the Sunderland reported her attack as being at 6358/0357 - in the same area.
The guncrew claimed to have shot down a catalina - no Catalina was missing on this date and the 422 aircraft was the only one unaccounted for.
U-476 was previously credited with shooting down the aircraft but this given the positions is quite impossible.
The account below came from Rainer Lang watch officer on 921 .



After this action 921 returned to Norway and was later lost with all hands.

[Tychsen]

In addition to Herr Lang's account - the crew from 422 RCAF Sunderland DV990 , the men Rainer Lang's guns shot down - today they might well buy each other a drink and compare notes on the past.



Guggirad had previously recieved a commendation for rescuing a man from the water. ( At Bowmore as far as I can recollect).
George Holly was only recently a father who would never meet his son - one 422 pilot told me how he had loaned Holly his new cap - when they never came back he had to buy another.
Holly had previously served with 422's sister squadron - which would attack U-921 within minutes of his being shot down.

Below the account of the attack delivered by Nesbitt's crew from 423 RCAF ORB , to understand fully what went on reading both sides is essential.
Within each Squadron's records a report was made on attacks which went to the Squadron CO , the base C.O. for cxomments and then on to Group.
Those which have survived are a pure goldmine - apart from the written account they include a diagram of the attack with refernce to sun , weather and sea conditions - photos ( if taken) are attached - in the cases of a sinking often the only source to disclose what took place.

This is from 423 ORB ref. Air27/832. 192828.
(Only that which deals with 921 is quoted.)
"Intercepted W/T message "SOS" followed by long dash14.20 position 6558N,0357S. 2nd Pilot sighted what appeared to be a large puff of smoke or splash 10/15 miles north.
A/C closed to investigate and front gunner sighted a visual wakemade by U-Boat 10/15 miles bearing northerly on course 035 speed 12 knots. A/C at 2000 ft. then closed to attack passing unknown wreckage on the port side.
U-Boat openned fire immediately with fairly heavy but inaccurate flak. A/C used evasive tactics and dove to attack U-Boat from port to starboard - stick dropped short 5 D.C's. released , No.6 failed to release. Last plume observed to be 30-40 feet short of the hull. U-Boat turned to starboard as D.C's. exploded and about one and half minutes later submerged.Nothing further was seen. No damage or casualties to A/C or crew.
A/C jettisoned last DC .
14.55 Circled over wreckage seen in the run in and it appeared to be that of an aircraft - whitish grey in colour and wing like in shape and was amid oil or fuel slick.
Captain came off patrol and S/C base".
( Scan of ORB very poor)

If I can lay hands on 921's KTB I will post it , but from memory the details of the attack are brief - those who directed the defence of the submarine being in no fit condition to dictate an account of events.

[Tychsen]

Did anyone make the connection between this ship and U-456 ?
The name Teichert should have jumped right out .



http://www.hmsedinburgh.co.uk/hmsedinburgh.htm

A major feather in the cap for the Kriegsmarine.
Hit by two torpedoes from U-456 , disabled and taken under tow she was later attacked by three destroyers and hit again - finally sunk by HMS Foresight which delivered the coup de grace.

Marine salvage expert Keith Jessop recovered some £50,000,000 plus of gold from the wreck in the 1980's.

Max-Martin Teichert was posthumously awarded his Knight's Cross on 19/12/43 , seven months after he was posted missing.( 108th U-Boat holder , 198th Holder in the Kgm).

[Shergar]

during the war 821 u boats were sunk or lost other statistics are royal navy 74 boats sunk or lost, american navy 55 subs sank or lost in total .

[Tychsen]

The reputation of the Uboat arm speaks for itself , 60% loss rate the vast majority of crews never sinking a ship and from 43 onwards fighting a losing battle in a weapons system which had been long been proven to be vunerable.

[Shergar]

additional information from a programme on the history channel is that the KM U boot arm of the sevice lost 30,000 men approx .

[Tychsen]

When you look back over how the war went for the UBoat arm when the opportunity really existed for success they had too few boats , as more came into service trained crew members were in short supply - the capture of U-570 is partly attritubited to corners being cut of the training programme and a lack of experienced men being available for the new boats.
With increasing pressure form aircraft "flak traps" and "staying up to fight" , the transit of Biscay by groups of U-Boats didn't really work.* - when they could be found and attacked at night the final end game had been reached.
The advent of the "Hunter -Killer Groups" further increased the pressure on an already over stretched ,ineffective and increasingly inexperienced U-Boat fleet.
The new boats when they arrived arrived too late and although in design they promised much , the progress of the new "electric boats" resembled that of the Panther in 1943. The new types presented many teething problems in terms of design and production difficulties which delayed their arrival at the front .
( Many techanical failures being the result of having to use inferior metals in the production process - had the boats arrived earlier and in numbers it is likely that many would have had to rrotate back to port for repairs and they may have presented a danger to the crews.)

Whilst Germany could design outstanding weapons systems , she no longer had the time or resources to develop them - even by 43 when these new boats were put down on paper - the war at sea had already been lost and really had been since 1942 - it was only a matter of things falling into place in the Allied camp.

The experience of the group of submarines of wihc U-921 was a part was repeated the next month when the Channel was effectively "bottled" ( Operation "Cork") and the U-boats could not interfere with Overlord.

[Shergar]

can i ask did an u boats see action during the invasion on 6th june 1944 or where they unaware and too late to take measures ?

[Tychsen]

Boats were sent from the Biscay ports to attack Channel shipping but given the shallow waters , the mass of anti submarine forces to hand it was a death sentence.
Jurgen Rowher mentions that on 6th June 17 boats from Brest and 14 from St.Nazaire are sent towards the Channel - it was impossible for non schnorkel boats to get into the Channel.
It was not until 14th June that the first U-boats penetrated the Channel.
In terms of Coastal Command they reshuffled their deck to bring most of their resoucres tio bear on the sealing the Channel of and securing the approaches to it - aircraft from Northern Ireland being redeployed to bases in England / South Wales and others being sent to patrol the area from N.I.
Whilst a large number of U-boats were directed towards a relatively compact area of sea which was "target rich" - the Allies with greater resoucres to hand made reaching that "target rich enviroment" a task in itself and extracted a high cost from their opposite numbers before they even got in range.
He describes a series of attacks made on the destroyer screens and Hunter Killer groups all with limited success - a number of boats are sunk by aircraft and surface craft.
When you look at the large number of aircraft contacts alone it speaks for itself - imagine how shot the nerves of the U-Boat crews were in view of what they were up against.
Even to make an attack , the response was bound to invite almost certain destruction - "Russian Roulette" was what it amounted to.
A copy from his "Chronology of the War at Sea" describes what too place , the "S" boats fared better and proved harder to counter.



http://chat.carleton.ca/~jnoakes/ram/cc/ccti41.html
Although a Coastal Command paper it does reflect what the U-Boat was up against and the nature of the force employed against them.
http://www.combinedops.com/D-Day.%20Coa ... ommand.htm